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Introduction 
Well-being is starting to become one of those buzzwords that it is hard to avoid. It 
seems to pop up in a variety o f different places, describing a variety of different things. 
Indeed, it appears in such diverse places as reports about the potential damage of the 
credit crunch,' and speeches by Oscar winning and Nobel prize winning former vice 
presidents.^ Not only is it a common term but some authors, like Haley and Senior, 
argue that "similar to the terms 'sustainable development', 'partnerships' and 'social 
inclusion', the term 'well-being' has become an amorphous, meaningless phrase, yet, as 
a part of common language it contributes to our normative frames of reference."^ 
While this thesis does not propose to argue that well-being has become meaningless it is 
worth noting the degree of challenge in setting about to examine a term that has such 
varied and different uses. This introduction hopes to provide: a brief overview of the 
challenges involved in examining the term well-being; it then traces the main reasoning 
and approach o f this thesis, which includes the reasoning for making the distinction 
between philosophical and operational approaches to well-being; before finally 
providing further details on each of the included chapters. 
Conceptual Challenges 
With a term like well-being it can be quite tempting to seek to give the term a precise 
and definite label as early as possible to enable a coherent examination. While this is 
certainly one approach it is worth sounding a cautionary tone on moving straight to this 
approach. Gasper makes the helpful point that "rather than set up a precisely delimited, 
' 'Policymaker Sees Economy Worsening', International Herald Tribune, Friday 26' September 2008, 
www.iht.com 
' Gore, A. Speech to Democratic Convention, Denver, 28"" August 2008, www.dnc.org 
^ Haley, D. & Senior, P. 'Art, Health and Well-being', Well-being: Individual, Community and Social 
Perspectives - Haworth, J . & Hart, G . (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.l 13 
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narrow, single notion o f well-being, and then try to police its 'correct' usage, we would 
do better to see well-being as an umbrella notion."^ This view is supported by Pettit and 
White who suggest, "well-being is a complex notion with many different dimensions 
whose definition is disputed."^ They helpfully also raise the issue o f well-being's mult i-
dimensional nature. This w i l l be considered further in the next section. 
Another cautionary note must be sounded regarding the purpose o f well-being research, 
which can in itself shape the examination made. Is well-being a variable, or a set o f 
variables to be maximised? This is certainly a view taken by many authors and explains 
why there is a strong link between conceptualisations and measurement. Indeed, there is 
a strong case to be made "that well-being is something that we do together, not 
something that we each possess. A n adequate account o f well-being is thus seen to 
require a theory of the range of basic institutions of social organization, within which 
people can make viable sense of their lives."^ 
A n analysis o f well-being is perhaps further complicated by the interchangeable words 
often used to either describe or define well-being. Many of these words have very 
similar meaning to well-being and some authors w i l l use them interchangeably while 
others w i l l not. As one author notes these words can include; quality o f l ife, living 
standards, human development, welfare, social welfare, well-l iving, utility, l ife 
" Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.29 
^ Pettit, J . & White, S. 'Participatory Approaches and the Measurement of Human Well-being', Human 
Well-being: Concept and Measurement, McGillivray, M. (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, 
p.242 
^ Haworth, J. & Hart, G. 'Introduction' Well-being: Individual, Community and Social Perspectives -
Haworth, J. & Hart, G . (eds), Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p. 12 
satisfaction, prosperity, needs fulfi lment, development, empowerment, capability 
expansion, poverty, human poverty and, more recently, happiness/ 
In any endeavour like this there is also the challenge o f saying what should be included 
in each particular area. This thesis looks at the common aspects raised by different 
authors and the empirical data available to examine them. The use of empirical data and 
the issues o f measurement and causality that this raises are discussed later in the thesis 
in the appropriate areas. 
Lastly there is perhaps the conceptual challenge o f recognising that debates around 
well-being have for a long time been shaped by the dominant operational approach o f 
welfare economics. Indeed, as Gasper argues, "a necessary intermediate objective is to 
clear away presumptions linked to the enthroning o f income per capita as the key 
indicator o f well-being - necessary given that indicator's long predominance and 
continuing centrality in policy analysis and public discourse." 
Approach of this Thesis 
In the previous section we saw that several authors suggest well-being is a multi-
dimensional concept that involves a number of different components. This thesis 
suggests that this is an effective way to conceive of well-being given its broad nature. 
However, while a precise and immutable definition is not recommended, certain 
distinctions, particularly at the conceptual level are both necessary and useful. 
^ McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.3 
Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', p.23 
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The primary distinction made is between philosophical and operational approaches to 
well-being. This distinction is, o f course, artificial; any philosophical approach is going 
to have scope to be operationalised, but this scope is considered substantially less than 
in operational approaches. Conversely, operational approaches have a philosophical 
underpinning o f some description, but are considered as operational approaches because 
of a higher scope for operationalisation than the philosophical approaches. 
The actual usage of different approaches to well-being in academic literature is also 
considered in determining whether an approach is more philosophical or operational. 
For example, much more has been written on Mi l l ' s understanding of utilitarianism than 
on operationalising his ideas, like the competent judge for example. Conversely, 
objective well-being approaches, like the Human Development Index ( H D l ) have 
created much discussion about the methodological and statistical issues surrounding it, 
and far less, though not insignificant, writings on the philosophical underpinnings o f the 
index. 
It may be helpful then to consider a spectrum of well-being approaches with 
philosophical on one end and operational on the other. A l l well-being approaches are 
somewhere on this spectrum, but their greater proximity to one or other o f the ends 
determines their definition. Thus while this distinction is made, o f more importance is 
the relationship between philosophical and operational approaches. 
The thesis suggests that there is a strong link between philosophical and operational 
approaches to well-being. It w i l l argue that the most effective measures o f well-being 
are those that provide a multi-dimensional approach at both the philosophical and 
operational level. It w i l l highlight this by looking at the role and relationship between 
11 
philosophical approaches and operational ones. In short then it suggests and seeks to 
demonstrate that different philosophical underpinnings lead to different operational 
outcomes and that this needs to be taken into account when examining well-being. 
Content of the Thesis 
Part I o f the thesis deals with three philosophical approaches to well-being; those of 
utilitarianism, justice as fairness and the capability approach. Each is considered in turn 
and where helpful for advancing the approach o f this thesis comparisons are made. Part 
11 looks at operational approaches to well-being and their philosophical underpinnings. 
It looks first at welfare economics and its emergence and divergence from 
utilitarianism. Next objective well-being is considered and possible enhancements for it 
are also raised. The thesis concludes by examining the relationship between 
philosophical approaches and operational ones and suggests how this conclusion might 
be o f use to continued understandings o f well-being. 
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Chapter 1 - Bentham and Mill's Utilitarianism 
This chapter looks at one o f the earlier conceptions o f happiness (or as argued later 
well-being), that o f classical utilitarianism. Utilitarianism first seeks to define utility or 
happiness and then to provide a teleological theory of morality by arguing for an 
approach that seeks to maximise happiness or utility. It is important to note, as Crisp 
points out, that it is both possible and important to keep clear the distinctiveness of a 
utilitarian conception of happiness or welfare and its view that morally we are required 
to maximise welfare.^ It is also worth noting that, like most theories, utilitarianism has 
evolved and altered in the many years it has been around. In this section then, classical 
utilitarianism is the form that is considered and this refers to the utilitarianism o f 
Bentham and M i l l rather than more current varieties. 
Most o f the debate around utilitarianism has centred on it being morally right to act in a 
way so as to maximise utility. However, this section focuses on the understandings of 
happiness and welfare that utilitarianism promotes. While this entails some 
consideration of philosophical arguments about the morality of maximising happiness 
as the guiding moral principle, these are, on the whole, considered outside the scope of 
this paper. 
Bentham's Utilitarianism 
In 1829 Jeremy Bentham wrote an essay entitled Article on Utilitarianism in which he 
laid out "the evolution and significance of the principle o f u t i l i ty ." ' " Bentham was one 
' Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, Routledge, London, 1997, p.20 
Bentham, J, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, Deontology together with A Table of Springs and 
Actions and Article on Utilitarianism, Goldworth, A (ed), Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 
xxxiii 
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of the earliest proponents o f utilitarianism. While others (including Hartley, Helvetius, 
Hume and Priestley) had talked about utility, happiness, pleasure and pain, it was 
Bentham who drew them all together into one coherent theory. 
In his w o r k ^ Table of Springs of Action Bentham defines utilitarianism as: "the 
utilitarian principle o f utility - act according to the greatest happiness o f the greatest 
number."'' This synthesis of utility understood in terms of pleasure and pain became 
Bentham's 'greatest happiness principle'. This principle was meant to direct and govern 
all aspects o f human action, both individual and social, moral and poli t ical . ' ' Before he 
could advocate a morality o f maximising happiness though, Bentham needed to both 
define what he meant by happiness and propose a way of measuring it, given his theory 
required cardinal comparisons and aggregation across people and time. 
Bentham's Definition of Happiness 
In his understanding of happiness Bentham drew on the work o f Kant who had explored 
the concept of pleasure as happiness and it being 'reasonable' to seek to maximise the 
good.'^ Bentham then believed pleasure and pain were the only two 'real entities' on 
which all others were based.'"* He understood 'happiness' to be pursuing pleasure and 
avoiding pain.'^ Further, "according to Bentham, the value o f any pleasure is to be 
determined by its durafion and intensity."'^ 
'' Bentham, J, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, p.25 
Bentham, J, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, p. 318 
Kant, I, Metaphysics of Ethics, Semple, JW (trans.), Thomas Clark Publishers, Edinburgh, 1836, p.6l 
*^ Bentham, J, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, p.98 
" Bentham, J, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, p. 320 
Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, 1997, p.22 
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Thus there are two key elements to Bentham's definition o f happiness. The first, as 
noted above, is a definition o f happiness composed o f pleasures and absences o f pain. 
This makes Bentham's view of happiness hedonistic. Bentham did not understand 
pleasure in a purely sensory fashion, but he was still concerned about the pursuit of 
p leasure .The second element is regarding the method of measuring utility or 
happiness, which was crucial to Bentham's approach. 
Bentham's Approach to Measuring Happiness 
This concept o f measurement and comparison was crucial to Bentham's thinking 
because it is necessary to assign values to different pleasures and pains so as to be able 
to maximise them across people and time.'^ It also raises key questions though about 
both the subjectivity of the values, how those values are measured and ascribed, and 
also how a model of comparison that seeks to maximise happiness can be formulated. 
We see that in Bentham's view happiness is either entirely, or largely subjective.'^ 
However, the subjectivity o f an individual's appraisal o f their happiness is not as 
problematic i f the theory is focused solely on how individuals can maximise their own 
happiness. For assuming individuals are rational (that is w i l l prefer pleasure to pain) and 
have a reasonable degree o f knowledge of what w i l l bring them pleasure the theory 
holds. For each individual would then act in the way they believed would maximise 
their own happiness. 
" Donner, W, 'Mill's Utilitarianism', Cambridge Companion to Mill, Skorupski, J (ed), CUP, 
Cambridge, 1998,p.257 
"* Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, p.21 
" Postema, G , 'Bentham's Utilitarianism', BlackweU's Guide to Mill's Utilitarianism, West, H (ed), 
Blackwell, Maiden, Maine, 2006, p.34 
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However, the problem with this subjective understanding o f happiness arises with the 
second aspect o f Bentham's view o f happiness, that it could be measured, absolutely 
necessary i f it is to be used as a moral theory for all. As Postema continues: "the 
problem is not that an individual cannot assess his own pleasurable experiences, but that 
doing so meaningfully across persons is very di f f icul t . " ' " Bentham's utilitarianism 
relied on objective inter-personal and inter-temporal comparisons being able to be made 
about an individual's subjective happiness. 
Bentham's approach to measuring happiness finds its fullest expression in his concept 
of felicific calculus. Donner provides a helpful summary: 
Bentham's felicific calculus is a method designed to measure the total quantity 
of pleasure and pain caused by an action. The method calls for a calculation of 
the quantity o f each pleasure and pain o f every person whose interests are 
affected. Then the balance o f quantity o f all the pleasures and pains is worked 
out to determine which action w i l l produce the greatest balance of pleasure over 
pain. The method quantifies intensity and duration and integrates them into the 
scale o f value. Since value is a function of quantity, the higher on the scale o f 
quantity each pleasure is placed, the greater is its value. Since Benthamite scales 
are cardinal, units that can be added and multiplied and so aggregated are 
required for each of the dimensions.'' 
Perhaps the most important aspect o f this method of measurement is that the scale was 
cardinal. That is, as Donner notes, units are similar so can be aggregated or multiplied. 
-° Postema, G , 'Bentham's Utilitarianism', p.35 
Donner, W, Mill's Utilitarianism, p.268 
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This is an important point to note for when the concept o f economic utility is examined 
in the section on welfare economics. 
Turning next to the issue, to do with a model o f maximising happiness, we find the 
main and crucial issue here is whose utility is to be maximised. At first Bentham 
defined utility as 'the greatest happiness for the greatest number'. However in his own 
work he illustrated the problems that would arise fi-om this definition and so later 
dropped the second part o f the definition to do with the greatest number, arguing, "on 
the surface, additional clearness and correctness was given to the idea: at the bottom, 
the opposite qualities."^' 
Even i f there is not an issue o f the greatest number there still arises a question o f how 
utility is measured. Is utility maximised for each individual and then aggregated to 
arrive at a societal component or is it maximised for society and then proportionally 
allocated to individuals. I f the first then it is not necessarily the greatest happiness (for a 
higher total utility might be obtained from a societal maximisation). Or i f it is the 
second then we see one o f the major criticisms o f utilitarianism that the 'greater good', 
that is aggregate ufil i ty, can come at the expense o f an individual's utility. 
Different commentators have understood Bentham's account o f this question in 
different ways. Postema argues Bentham's principle requires the happiness o f the 
individual be sacrificed i f a greater increase in community happiness can be achieved. 
Bentham, J, The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham, p.309 
Postema, G , 'Bentham's Utilitarianism', p.33 
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However, as Postema notes, others have argued strongly that "Bentham thought it 
fundamentally important that the welfare of each individual be considered one-by-one. 
He did not accept the view, often attributed to him, that the good or welfare of an 
individual could be entirely subordinated to the welfare o f the community as a whole. 
It has also been suggested that Bentham himself attempted to work round this problem 
by moving in his later works to understand general utility more in terms of general 
interest than general happiness. This issue, of the role and importance o f the 
individual and society is a crucial fault line of utilitarianism and one to which we w i l l 
return later. 
Thus, Bentham's utilitarianism is important to an understanding of well-being because 
it has been hugely influential on operational approaches to well-being, primarily that of 
welfare economics. It has provided (with some adaptations, discussed in Chapter 4) a 
philosophical foundation for measurable inter-personal comparisons o f utility. 
Bentham's views went a long way to entrenching the idea that well-being (or at least 
utility or happiness) was best understood as the maximisation o f certain variables. 
Further, given Bentham's view was a teleological theory of morality, it allowed a 
separation o f the right and the good (discussed further in Chapter 2) which has also had 
a significant influence on understandings o f well-being. 
Thus in the utilitarianism of Bentham we see the two key premises o f the theory. Firstly 
an understanding o f happiness that is centred around pleasure and pain and secondly a 
theory o f morality that to maximise happiness is the morally best course of action. In 
short then, Bentham saw the primary objective o f human existence to be the pursuit o f 
Postema, G , 'Bentham's Utilitarianism', p.41 
Postema, G , 'Bentham's Utilitarianism', p.37 
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happiness. While this understanding o f happiness provides certain elements there still 
remain crucial aspects o f this theory that were not developed. It rested then on JS M i l l 
to enhance and develop Bentham's theories. 
Mill's Utilitarianism and Understanding and Definition of Happiness 
Bentham's work on utility and happiness was substantially developed and modified by 
JS M i l l , the son of one o f Bentham's close friends, James, M i l l ' s father. Like Bentham, 
M i l l also uses happiness and utility interchangeably saying, in the General Remarks to 
Utilitarianism, that he wishes to "contribute something towards the understanding and 
appreciation o f the Utilitarian or Happiness theory."^^ He also defined it in terms o f 
pleasure and pain. As M i l l states: 
The creed which accepts as the foundation o f morals, Utili ty, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to 
promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse o f happiness. By 
happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, 
and the privation of pleasure.^' 
However while similar to Bentham in defining happiness as pleasure minus pain, M i l l 
greatly widens what constitutes pleasure. As Williams states, Mi l l ' s "formal definition 
of utility is orthodox Benthamism in its account o f happiness as pleasure and the 
absence of pain; the difference lies in his further elaboration."^^ Williams continues: 
Happiness, however, is now clarified in terms which show Mi l l ' s departure from 
Benthamism and also his further elaboration of the idea of character and its 
Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, On Liberty, Considerations on Representative Government and Remarks on 
Bentham's Philosophy, Willaims, G (ed), J.M, Dent, London, 2001, p.4 
" Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p.7 
Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p.xxix 
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development which he began to formulate after his mental crisis. Happiness now 
seems much more like the Greek eudaimonia - a development of those 
capacities which are characteristically human, a fulfi lment o f those potentialities 
which are unique to human beings."^ 
Thus M i l l retains a Benthamite understanding o f utility with pleasure and pain, but 
vastly widens the scope of what constitutes pleasure and pain. As Dormer notes, "good 
resides in internal mental states o f pleasure or happiness. But while for Bentham these 
mental states are sensations o f pleasure, for M i l l they are far more complex states of 
e x p e r i e n c e . I n part this has the effect on providing more of a focus on character. 
M i l l also shifts the focus o f utilitarianism from a more narrowly focused hedonistic 
explanation to an all encompassing theory o f morality and human development. " M i l l ' s 
fundamental purpose is to promote human self-development and so he is centrally 
occupied with exploring the forms of character that allow humans to pursue meaningful 
lives."^' This development in utilitarianism in the direction o f character formation and 
virtue may well be in part due to the influence of Greek philosophers with whom M i l l 
was very familiar who "placed philosophy and other intellectual and moral activities at 
the centre of their conceptions o f human happiness or welfare."^" This expansion of the 
understanding o f pleasure provided both advantages and disadvantages. In widening its 
scope. M i l l provided a deeper and fuller understanding o f human action and a greater 
Mill, JS, Utililarianism, p.xxix 
°^ Donner, W, 'Mill's Utilitarianism', p.257 
Donner, W, 'Mill's Utilitarianism', p.259 
"^ Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, p.25 
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emphasis on character.^^ However, this then made the task o f measuring happiness that 
much more complicated. 
Mill's Approach to Measuring Happiness 
Like Bentham, M i l l faces the problem of being able to measure subjective experiences 
of pleasure in a way that allows comparison. Mi l l ' s solution is that o f a competent 
judge. As he explains: 
On a question which is the best worth having o f two pleasures, or which of two 
modes o f existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral 
attributes and from its consequences, the judgment o f those who are qualified by 
knowledge o f both, or, i f they differ, that o f the majority among them, must be 
admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment 
respecting the quality o f pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred 
to even on the question o f quantity.^'* 
While this helps clarify the theoretical problem of how to differentiate between different 
persons' subjective experiences o f happiness, it still leaves a practical problem i f any 
measurements are to be made. Indeed for M i l l the concept o f measuring utility is not so 
much a choice by choice activity as a general exercise o f an individual's character and 
society's institutions. Thus for M i l l , a utilitarian philosophy includes the pursuit of 
virtue, even though he would argue this was not the end in itself As he states: 
The utilitarian standard, while it tolerates and approves those other acquired 
desires, up to the point beyond which they would be more injurious to the 
general happiness than promotive of it, enjoins and requires the cultivation of 
"'^  Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, p.l 1 
Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p.l 1 
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the love o f virtue up to the greatest strength possible, as being above all things 
important to the general happiness. 
Further there are significant difference between the methods o f measurement that 
Bentham and M i l l use when considering pleasure or pain. Donner outlines the main 
differences well: 
Both M i l l and Bentham require methods o f measuring the value o f different 
mental states, but they come up with very different procedures. [ . . . ] Mi l l ' s 
theory does have more dimensions o f value to contend with and is more 
complicated. Applying Mi l l ' s procedure, after intensity and duration have been 
synthesized, the resulting scale o f quantity must in turn be integrated with that of 
quality to form an overall judgment of value. Some kinds o f qualities o f 
pleasurable experience are judged to be more valuable and thus placed higher on 
the scale o f quality by competent agents. Competent agents rank pleasurable 
experiences on scales that measure their value. Their preferences represent a 
judgment o f the value of the experiences resting on the good-making properties 
of quantity and quality. 
Thus in his definitions and measurements M i l l uses a 'competent judge' to provide 
qualitative measurements o f pleasurable experiences to go alongside the quantitative 
measurements provided by Bentham. While this is an advantage in terms of widening 
the definition and so enabling it to be more encompassing, it provides even more 
challenges in regard to actual measurement. It also shifts the focus away from 
35 
Donner, W, 'Mill's Utilitarianism', p.268 
Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p.39 
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subjective experience, for while it is still the individuals experiencing the pleasure, its 
value is now being (potentially) determined by someone else (the competent judge). 
Mill's Understanding of the Roles of the Individual and Community 
It was noted earlier that a criticism of utilitarianism has been its bias towards the 
welfare o f the community over and above that of the individual. M i l l certainly seems, in 
Utilitarianism at least to value the communal happiness more and defines it as the 
standard o f right. In Utilitarianism he says: 
1 must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice 
to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard o f what 
is right in conduct, is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. 
As between his own happiness and that o f others, utilitarianism requires him to 
be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator."^' 
A logical implication o f this then is that in a choice between individual and general 
happiness, the 'right ' course is to pursue the general happiness, even i f at the expense of 
the individual. 
However in his other writings and to an extent in Utilitarianism M i l l sees a crucial role 
for justice in promoting general happiness also. 
Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly 
more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative, than any others are 
as a class (though, not more so than others may be in particular cases); and 
which, therefore, ought to be, as well as naturally are, guarded by a sentiment 
not only different in degree, but also in kind; distinguished from the milder 
" Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p. 17 
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feeling which attaches to the mere idea of promoting human pleasure or 
convenience, at once by the more definite nature of its commands, and by the 
sterner character o f its sanctions."^** 
Further, as is seen in M i l l ' s other works (particularly On Liberty) he places a high value 
on individual liberty and the freedom of individuals to pursue their self-determined 
goals. Crisp points out: 
The principles he recommends in On Liberty, even though they make no explicit 
reference to the utility principle, derive their plausibility from that principle. The 
liberty principle states that such interference is justified only to prevent harm to 
others, and this principle not only rules out paternalistic justifications for 
interference, but provides the underpinning for a protected self-regarding sphere. 
The liberty principle rests upon individuality, which has welfare value in itself 
when instantiated in people's lives, as well as being o f great instrumental value 
as humanity progresses.''^ 
It seems then in some ways unclear exactly what the balance M i l l saw between the 
individual and society was, particularly in the tensions between general happiness and 
individual liberty. While these views are recognised by commentators, their respective 
meanings are contested. 
Conclusions on Utilitarian Views of Happiness 
Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p.67 
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So in summary "the idea at the heart o f utilitarianism is that actions and institutions 
should increase the overall amount o f happiness in the w o r l d . B o t h Bentham and M i l l 
saw this as the chief goal of mankind and understood utility to be the same as happiness 
and to be considered by maximising pleasure and avoiding pain. They both went further 
though and, in somewhat different ways, believed morality could be understood in 
terms o f maximising the general happiness. While this led to tensions between 
individual and communal conceptions o f happiness, it also raised crucial questions 
regarding the measurement of happiness which is vital i f it is to be maximised. 
It is these approaches and understandings of happiness and its measurement that this 
paper is interested in and in this last part o f the section on utilitarianism its similarities 
to well-being are considered. 
Utilitarianism and Weil-Being 
Up to this point the term well-being has not been used in discussions about classical 
utilitarianism. However, in its attempt to define and understand happiness and its 
conception of happiness as virtually all encompassing, utilitarianism has many 
similarities with some contemporary uses and understandings o f the term well-being. 
Indeed, certain utilitarian writers use the terms utility, welfare, happiness, and wel l -
being synonymously. For example Crisp explains it as follows: 
Welfare, then, is what makes a person's life worth living for that person. Though 
one could make fine distinctions here, I shall take it to be roughly equivalent to a 
person's good, self-interest, flourishing, well-being, prudential value or 
utility."^^ 
Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, p.7 
Crisp, R, Mill on Utilitarianism, p. 19 
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As does Shaw when he says: "Welfarism is the value thesis that individual welfare or 
well-being is all that ultimately matters; it is the sole good, the only thing that is 
intrinsically valuable or valuable for its own sake. [ . . . ] Like other early utilitarians, 
Bentham and M i l l equated happiness with pleasure and unhappiness with pain, and they 
were concerned with happiness only because they identified it with well-being or what 
is good for people." 
Indeed Shaw goes further and argues that: "what really matters for utilitarianism is well-
being whether or not one understands it in terms of happiness . Indeed it can be seen 
why utilitarianism could and is equated with well-being. It allows for the broad 
understanding as understood by M i l l while still retaining a distinctiveness (regarding a 
definition based on pleasure) that at least allows for some sort o f comparison. This is 
not a comparison in the sense of Bentham, that is a cardinal comparison, but an ordinal 
one that indicates preference. Some modem utilitarians argue that this 'ranking' is all 
that is really required and a numeric value system is not needed. '^ ^ As Shaw goes on to 
state: 
Utilitarianism holds that a state of affairs is good or bad to some degree (and 
better or worse than some other state o f affairs) only in virtue o f the well-being 
of the lives of particular individuals, and it goes on to a f f i rm that each person's 
well-being is equally valuable, that his happiness or unhappiness, her pleasure or 
pain, carries the same weight as that o f any other person. Thus, total net 
43 Shaw, W, 'Contemporary Criticisms of Utilitarianism: A Response', BlachA'ell's Guide to Mill's 
Utilitarianism, West, H (ed), Blackwell, Maiden, Maine, 2006, p.202 
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happiness is simply the sum of everyone's happiness or unhappiness, with more 
happiness here counterbalancing less happiness there 46 
Thus in conclusion we can see that Bentham and Mi l l ' s work and understandings o f 
utility as happiness have been re-conceptualised in contemporary discussion as being 
about well-being. This has been done with good reason given some contemporary 
understandings o f well being have much similarity with aspects o f the concept o f 
utilitarianism put forward by M i l l in particular. However, in Part I I , we w i l l see how 
welfare economics developed the concept o f utility first seen here in the writings of 
Bentham and M i l l . We continue now though to consider two more philosophical 
approaches to well-being, those o f Rawls and Sen. 
Shaw, W, 'Contemporary Criticisms of Utilitarianism: A Response', p.202 
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Chapter 2 - Rawls' Theory of Justice and His Critique of 
Utilitarianism 
Rawls' book A Theory of Justice presents one of the strongest arguments against 
utilitarianism o f recent times. Rawls explicitly sets out to provide an alternative 
conception of justice, that o f justice as fairness, to that o f utilitarianism."*^ This chapter 
looks first at an understanding o f Rawls' conception o f justice as fairness, before 
looking at its critique of utilitarianism and then finally looks at how Rawls' critique of 
utilitarianism and his concept of justice as fairness enriches our understanding o f well-
being. 
Rawls' Theory of Justice 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls says his aim 
"is to present a conception of justice which generalises and carries to a higher 
level o f abstraction the familiar theory o f the social contract as found, say, in 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant. [ . . . ] The guiding idea is that the principles o f 
justice for the basic structure of society are the object o f the original agreement. 
They are the principles that free and rational persons would accept in an initial 
position o f equality as defining the ftjndamental terms of their association."^** 
Crucial to this understanding of justice is that the principles o f society are chosen from 
behind a "veil o f ignorance."^^ That is a hypothetical, ahistorical situation " in which no 
one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know 
Rawls, J . A Theory of Justice, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1972, p.3 
Rawls, J . A Theory of Justice, p. 1 1 
Rawls, J . A Theory of Justice, p. 12 
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his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength 
and the like."^° In this situation Rawls argues people w i l l choose what is ' fa i r ' because 
they w i l l rationally not choose a system which would be to their disadvantage. But 
without knowing where they w i l l be in the society they choose a system that is as 
advantageous to them as to any other individual. 
The conception of justice as fairness leads to the adoption o f two different principles. 
According to Rawls "the first requires equality in the assignment o f basic rights and 
duties, while the second holds that social and economic inequalities, for example 
inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only i f they result in compensating benefits 
for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members o f society."^' In short, 
this places justice and equality (of opportunity not outcome) at the heart o f a system of 
society and that through the "veil of ignorance" process this is shown to be the optimal 
arrangement for rational persons. 
Rawls' Criticisms of Utilitarianism 
Before moving onto the objections to particular parts o f utilitarianism, Rawls makes 
some interesting points about the approach o f the theory as a whole. Rawls argues 
utilitarianism is a teleological theory and as such creates a separation between what is 
good and what is right. As he says: 
It is essential to keep in mind that in a teleological theory the good is defined 
independently from the right. This means two things. First, the theory accounts 
for our considered judgments as to which things are good (our judgments of 
value) as a separate class of judgments intuitively distinguishable by common 
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p. 12 
'^ Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p. 14 
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sense, and then proposes the hypothesis that the right is maximizing the good as 
already specified. Second, the theory enables one to judge the goodness of 
things without referring to what is right. For example, i f pleasure is said to be 
the sole good, then presumably pleasures can be recognized and ranked in value 
by criteria that do not presuppose any standards o f right, or what we would 
normally think o f as such.^' 
This was the point made in the preceding chapter regarding the utilitarianism of 
Bentham and M i l l , that the separation of the good and the right has had a profound 
influence on operational approaches to well-being, particularly that of welfare 
economics which w i l l be discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Rawls goes on to show how this influences the conception of what is 'good' and that 
this varies with different teleological theories.^'' Rawls draws a distinction between 
happiness and utilitarianism. He argues eudaimonism is concerned with the pursuit of 
happiness not utilitarianism. His definition o f utilitarianism is, it is argued, a more 
modem one, defined as the satisfaction of desire or satisfaction o f rational desire.^ "* This 
is a more modem economic definition and seems somewhat different to the classical 
definition put forward by Bentham and M i l l . 
Rawls also believes his original conception o f justice, derived through the veil of 
ignorance, provides an explicit refutation o f utilitarian reasoning. In explaining this he 
argues, "thus it seems that the principle of utility is incompatible with the conception of 
"^ Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p.25 
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social cooperation among equals for mutual advantage."^^ And then that "these 
principles rule out just ifying institutions on the grounds that the hardships o f some are 
offset by a greater good in the aggregate. 
Rawls' argument against utilitarianism follows the line that any forced loss o f 
'happiness' for an individual is a violation o f his equality with all others. This then 
contravenes the 'justice as fairness' principle that was the basis for Rawls' societal 
organisation. In other words, once 'justice as fairness' is accepted as a foundational 
principle o f society, then utilitarianism cannot be part of society because it involves 
behaviour (forced individual sacrifices for greater communal good) that had been 
rejected in the initial formation because they are not to everyone's advantage. 
One o f Rawls' strongest specific objections is to the concept held by many utilitarians, 
that it is the societal utility or total happiness rather than the utility of each individual 
that matters most.^^ Rawls' objection is as follows: 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice, that even the welfare 
of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice denies that the loss 
of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. It does not 
allow that the sacrifices imposed on the few are outweighed by the larger sum of 
58 
advantages enjoyed by the many. 
This is followed up in another helpful passage where Rawls states: 
Rawls, J. A Theory of.Justice, p. 14 
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At least with justice as fairness all persons have the necessary freedoms, 
opportunities, and resources to freely pursue a wide range of conceptions of the 
good. This is not guaranteed under the principle o f utility.^^ 
Further, Rawls argues that utilitarianism erodes the individual in specific cases (where 
an individual sacrifice results in a greater good) but also in generality. Rawls suggests 
Mi l l ' s idea of a competent judge erodes individuality because " i t is this spectator who is 
conceived as carrying out the required organization o f the desires o f all persons into one 
coherent system of desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into 
one. 
As well as making the more common criticisms to do with the individual and society 
Rawls also makes the important point to do with distribution o f utility. That is: 
The striking feature o f the utilitarian view of justice is that it does not matter, 
except indirectly, how this sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals 
any more than it matters, except indirectly, how one man distributes his 
satisfactions over time. The correct distribution in either case is that which 
yields the maximum fulfilment."^' 
One final criticism of utilitarianism that Rawls provides is that because o f the way it is 
conceived utilitarianism faces an inherent moral problem. 
In utilitarianism the satisfaction o f any desire has some value in itself which 
must be taken into account in deciding what is right. In calculating the greatest 
Freeman, S, 'Introduction', Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Freeman, S (ed), Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 18 
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balance o f satisfaction it does not matter, except indirectly, what the desires are 
for. We are to arrange institutions so as to obtain the greatest sum o f 
satisfactions; we ask no questions about their source or quality but only how 
their satisfacfion would affect the total of well-being. Social welfare depends 
directly and solely upon the levels o f satisfacfion or dissatisfaction o f 
individuals." 
Rawls is arguing it is the process o f satisfaction that provides the 'value' rather than 
what is being satisfied. He goes on to show this means society should give as much 
weight to the satisfaction of desires which society might consider wrong or destructive 
as to those it might consider good and beneficial to all.^^ 
Thus, there are several reasons why Rawls' critique o f utilitarianism enriches our 
understanding o f approaches to well-being. First, as Rawls notes, utilitarianism makes a 
distinction between the good and the right. Further, the right becomes an attempt to 
maximise the good, in this case utility or happiness. This has a direct bearing on 
operational approaches to well-being, like welfare economics which is centred around 
utility maximisation. As we have seen, utilitarianism provides the philosophical 
underpinning for this. Secondly, Rawls' critique also both identifies this distinction and 
highlights its shortcomings. Rawls' critique prompts us to ask the question as to 
whether well-being is a best understood as a variable maximising exercise or as 
something else. Finally, Rawls argues utilitarianism and welfare economics ascribe 
value (at least in part) to the act o f satisfying a desire rather than on the object of the 
desire. 
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p.30 
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We begin to see here in Rawls' philosophical approach, a critique o f not only utilitarian 
philosophical approaches that rely on shared highest preference ordering but perhaps 
also operational approaches, like welfare economics, that use a similar sort of approach. 
Indeed, many of the criticisms Rawls' raises regarding utilitarianism can, we wi l l see, 
apply to welfare economics also. 
Rawls' Understanding of Well-being 
Rawls' contribution to an understanding of well-being comes in several ways. First, 
Rawls concept o f the veil of ignorance provides a philosophical basis for a normative 
element o f well-being derived through individuals' rational preference. While 
formulated at a theoretical level, this concept does provide an approach to examining 
whether any universal components o f well-being can be formulated. Secondly, Rawls 
contribution provides a theoretical construct that allows a two tier method of conceiving 
and operationalising well-being and dealing with the trade-offs inherent in societal 
decisions about well-being. These are the primary social goods identified by Rawls and 
his difference principle. 
This difference principle further enables Rawls philosophical approach of justice as 
fairness to be better operationalised because, as Rawls points out, "as long as we can 
identify the least advantaged representative man, only ordinal judgements o f well-being 
are required from then on. We know from what position the social system is to be 
judged. [ . . . ] The further difficulties of cardinal measurement do not arise since no other 
interpersonal comparisons are necessary."^" This is important in understandings of well-
being because the ordinalist revolution (discussed in Chapter 4) overcame the 
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p.91 
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difficulties o f classical utilitarianism's cardinal approach, but largely retained its focus 
on all interpersonal comparisons. Rawls approach on the other hand is ordinal and so 
not susceptible to cardinal difficulties, but provides a different focus on well-being, that 
o f the least advantaged. Rawls' concept of well-being then provides a foundation o f 
basic goods that are inviolable, and a guiding principle (the difference principle) for the 
governing o f decisions made above and beyond those involving basic goods. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion then, Rawls' theory of justice thus enriches our understanding of well-
being in two main ways. First by providing a strong criticism to the utilitarian account 
o f well-being and secondly by advocating a different, two-tier, approach, based on the 
social contract principle. In these two ways we are able to formulate a different 
philosophical conception o f well-being than that o f utilitarianism. However, while, as 
noted above, Rawls theory requires only ordinal comparisons there still remain barriers 
to the operationalising of the theory as a whole. 
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Chapter 3 - Sen's Capability Approach 
Introduction 
The capability approach pioneered by Sen was developed in part as a response to the 
perceived shortcomings and limitations of existing well-being measures, particularly 
those based around comparisons o f income.^^ As Sen explains in his definition of the 
capability approach, "The capability approach to a person's advantage is concerned 
with evaluating it in terms o f his or her actual ability to achieve various valuable 
functionings as a part o f living."^^ 
In even this short definition we see some key differences between Sen's capability 
approach and the other philosophical approaches already considered. Two points worth 
drawing out f rom this initial definition are to do with what Sen calls 'abil i ty ' and 
'ftinctionings'. Both these concepts are central to an understanding of the capability 
approach and w i l l be discussed ftjrther in this chapter. 
However, before moving on to a fuller understanding o f the capabilities approach it is 
necessary to develop further how it is related to well-being. To illustrate the connection 
a bit more fu l ly . Sen says: 
On what does the claim of functionings to reflect well-being rest? Basically, the 
claim builds on the straightforward fact that how well a person is must be a 
matter o f what kind of l i fe he or she is living, and what the person is succeeding 
Sen, A. Commodities and Capabilities, Elsevier Science, Amsterdam, 1985, p.39 
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in 'doing' or 'being'. The exercise must, in one way or another, take the form of 
valuing the functioning vectors reflecting the 'doings' and 'beings'. 
It may now perhaps be helpful to provide a fuller definition of the capability approach 
that also brings out two o f Sen's other key concepts, those o f agency and freedom. As 
he notes: 
"We can make a fourfold classification o f points o f evaluative interest in 
assessing human advantage, based on two different distinctions. One is between 
the promotion o f the person's well-being, and the pursuit o f the person's overall 
agency goals. The latter encompasses goals that a person has reasons to adopt, 
which can inter aha include goals other than the advancement o f his or her own 
well-being. It can thus generate orderings different f rom that of well-being. The 
second distinction is between achievement, and the freedom to achieve. This 
contrast can be applied both to the perspective of well-being and to that of 
agency. The two distinctions together yield four different concepts o f advantage, 
related to a person: 'well-being achievement', 'agency achievement', 'wel l -
being freedom', and 'agency freedom'. These different notions, which I have 
tried to discuss more extensively elsewhere, are not, o f course, unrelated to each 
other, but nor are they necessarily identical."^** 
Thus it is suggested that one of the strengths o f the capability approach is its recognition 
and conceptual distinction between different points of evaluative interest. Sen's 
distinction between well-being and agency helpfully provides the ability to assess both 
behaviour that promotes one's own well-being and action that might be taken to 
Sen, A. Commodities and Capahililies, p.28 
Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', p.275 
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promote another's well-being even i f that is detrimental to the person involved. This 
distinction allows a more precise understanding of well-being because different 
motivations and outcomes are allowed to be recognised as such. 
Valuation and the Evaluative Space 
Related to this is another aspect o f the capability approach that highlights issues to do 
with the evaluation o f capabilities. Sen calls this the 'evaluative space'.^^ That is the 
area and scope in which the evaluations occur. By defining the evaluative space and 
conceptually addressing it as an issue, Sen allows a greater scope for his theory. This is 
because he suggests the capability approach can still be used when there is disagreement 
over the nature o f the evaluative space.^^ He shows for example that there could be a 
general agreement over certain basic capabilities even i f many others were still 
disputed. 
By having this conception o f evaluative space. Sen is also able to make clearer the 
distinction between agency achievement and well-being achievement that was noted 
earlier. Each o f the four aspects can have a different evaluative space, more suited for 
their particular requirements. He gives the following example: 
The difference between agency achievement and well-being achievement is not 
only a matter o f space (the former taking us beyond the person's own life and 
functionings), but also one of differential weighting o f the shared elements (i.e. 
for the functionings that are pertinent both to one's well-being and to one's other 
Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', pp.272-273 
™ Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', p.283 
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objectives, possibly different weights may be attached in agency evaluation vis-
a-vis well-being appraisal).^" 
There are also considerations around the method of valuation people have. We saw 
utilitarianism leaves it up to individuals to decide what they value, arguing the desires 
indicate their valuation and that what matters is the perceived satisfaction o f that desire 
rather than the object. Rawls on the other hand distinguishes between primary and non-
primary social goods and so places a higher valuation on certain liberties and freedoms 
he considers basic. Sen though takes a third approach to this problem as the quote below 
illustrates. Sen comments: 
A person who is il l-fed, undernourished, unsheltered and i l l can still be high up 
in the scale o f happiness or desire-fulfilment i f he or she has learned to have 
'realistic' desires and to take pleasure in small mercies. The physical conditions 
of a person do not enter the view of well-being seen entirely in terms of 
happiness or desire-fulfilment, except insofar as they are indirectly covered by 
the mental atfitudes o f happiness or desire. And this neglect is fortif ied by the 
lack o f interest, o f these two perspectives, in the person's own valuation as to 
what kind of a life would be worthwhile. Valuing is not the same thing as 
desiring, and the strength o f desire is influenced by considerations o f realism in 
one's circumstances. Nor is valuing invariably reflected by the amount o f pain i f 
the valued object is not obtained."^^ 
72 Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', p.276 
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There is still though further development needed regarding the nature o f capabilities. 
Sen argues that capabilities are derived from functionings'" which leads us on to the 
next section o f the chapter which examines capabilities in more depth via the concept of 
functionings. 
Functionings 
The concept o f functionings was raised in the initial definition o f the capability 
approach. What exactly are they though? Sen understands functionings in the following 
way: 
Functionings represent parts o f the state o f a person - in particular the various 
things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a 
person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can 
achieve, and f rom which he or she can choose one collection. The approach is 
based on a view of living as a combination of various 'doings and beings', with 
quality of l ife to be assessed in terms of the capability to achieve valuable 
functionings.^^ 
Sen goes on to list some of the functionings that exist, from elementary ones like 
mortality or being nourished to more complex ones like being happy or taking part in 
the life of the community.''^ In short then a functioning "is an achievement o f a person: 
what he or she manages to do or to be. It reflects, as it were, a part o f the 'state' of that 
person."" 
Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', pp.277-278 
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Also worth noting here though is that this approach allows contextual analysis that is 
different to either utilitarianism or justice as fairness. Both o f these approaches would 
use the same method o f analysis, whether utility or the difference principle, in a variety 
of contexts (indeed this would be considered by both approaches a distinct strength). 
However, while this is also possible with the capability approach (as that would just 
involve measuring the same capabilities) this approach also allows comparisons o f 
different capabilities that might be more relevant in certain contexts. Sen gives the 
fol lowing helpful example: 
In the richer countries, the functionings involving longevity, nourishment, basic 
health, avoiding epidemics, being literate, etc., may have less variation from 
person to person, but there are other functionings that do vary a great deal. The 
ability to entertain friends, be close to people one would like to see, take part in 
the life of the community etc., may vary a good deal even within a rich country, 
such as the USA or the UK.^ ** 
Another important point that Sen makes which w i l l be explored ftirther in Part I I is the 
difference between the fiinctioning itself and the commodities that can be used to 
achieve those functionings. As he says, "a functioning is thus different both from (I) 
having goods (and the corresponding characteristics), to which it is posterior, and (2) 
having utility (in the form of happiness resulting from that functioning), to which it is, 
in an important way, prior."^^ What this means also is that the method of evaluating 
functionings (which w i l l be considered in further detail in the next section) is of greater 
scope. As w i l l be shown in Chapter 4, economics uses money or at least willingness to 
pay as a short-hand proxy for utility. In contrast the capabilities approach is not limited 
''^  Sen, A. Commodities and Capabilities, p.46 
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solely to market-measures and so can use a wider range o f non-market direct 
observations to assess functionings. 
This view of the capability approach has been taken by other writers as well. Alkire, for 
example provides the fol lowing summary of the capability approach: 
A person's achieved functionings at any given time are the particular 
functionings he or she has successfully pursued and realized. [ . . . ] Capabilities 
refers to a person's or group's freedom (or agency) to promote or achieve 
valuable functionings. [ . . . ] In the capability approach, freedom is concerned 
with 'the real opportunity that we have to accomplish what we value', and like 
Aristotle and Marx among others. Sen argues the freedom has intrinsic as well 
as instrumental value.^' 
Freedom 
We saw in the first definition of the capability approach that capability was based 
around the 'actual ability to achieve various functionings.' For this to be true freedom 
needs to be a central component o f the capability approach and we saw that both agency 
achievement and agency freedom were key parts. Sen provides a useful summary 
saying: 
Second, freedom may have intrinsic importance for the person's well-being 
achievement. Acting freely and being able to choose may be directly conducive 
to well-being, not just because more freedom may make better alternatives 
available. This view is contrary to the one typically assumed in standard 
consumer theory, in which the contribution o f a set o f feasible choices is judged 
Sen, A. Commodilies and Capabilities, p.45 
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exclusively by the value o f the best element available. Even the removal o f all 
the elements o f a feasible set (e.g. of a 'budget set) other than the chosen best 
element is seen, in that theory, as no real loss, since the freedom to choose does 
not, in this view, matter in itself. In contrast, i f choosing is seen as a part of 
living (and 'doing x ' is distinguished f rom 'choosing to do x and doing i t ' ) , then 
even 'well-being achievement' need not be independent o f the freedom reflected 
in the capability set.^ ^ 
Freedom can thus be seen as crucial to Sen's capability approach. Some authors have 
suggested that the language o f freedom has come to be stressed above that of even 
capability, though this is probably somewhat o f an exaggeration.**^ 
The Capability Approach in Comparative Perspective 
One of the points Sen makes about the capability approach is the one we saw earlier 
regarding the use o f the evaluative space. As he says, "the functioning view has an 
easier run than the utility view partly because it avoids premature fixity. It divides up 
the problem of evaluation of well-being into two : distinct (though not independent) 
parts, viz., (i) specification o f functioning achievements, and ( i i ) valuation o f 
functioning achievements."**'' 
Sen also argues for the capability approach on the advantage that it recognises the 
individuality and differences o f people. We saw in chapter 2 that Rawls argues that 
" Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', pp.278-279 
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utilitarianism disregards individuality.**^ We now find Sen making the same claim about 
justice as fairness arguing: 
The primary goods approach seems to take little note of the diversity o f human 
beings. In the context o f assessing utilitarian equality, it was argued that i f 
people were fundamentally similar in terms of utility functions, then the 
ufilitarian concern with maximising the sum-total o f utilities would push us 
simultaneously also in the direction o f equality o f utility levels. Thus 
utilitarianism could be rendered vastly more attractive i f people really were 
similar. A corresponding remark can be made about the Rawlsian Difference 
Principle. I f people were basically very similar, then an index of primary goods 
might be quite a good way o f judging advantage. But, in fact, people seem to 
have very different needs varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions, 
location, work conditions, temperament, and even body size (affecting food and 
clothing requirements). So what is involved is not merely ignoring a few hard 
cases, but overlooking a very widespread and real differences. Judging 
advantage purely in terms o f primary goods leads to a partially blind morality.**'' 
Again Sen provides a very helpful summary of some o f the key differences between the 
capability approach and other philosophical approaches to well-being. As he notes: 
It differs from other approaches using other informational focuses, for example, 
personal utility (focusing on pleasures, happiness, or desire f i i l f i lment) , absolute 
or relative opulence (focusing on commodity bundles, real income, or real 
wealth), assessments o f negative freedoms (focusing on procedural fulfi lment of 
libertarian rights and rules o f non-interference), comparisons o f means of 
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p.27 
Sen, A. Choice, Welfare and Measurement, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982, p.366 
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freedom (e.g. focusing on the holdings of 'p r imary goods', as in the Rawlsian 
theory of justice), and comparisons o f resource holdings as a basis of just 
equality (e.g. as in Dworkin's criterion of 'equali ty o f resources').**^ 
Thus it seems that Sen's capability approach provides a multi-dimensional assessment 
of well-being, via the evaluative space and the distinction between well-being agency 
and well-being achievement, while still enabling some form of measurement and 
comparisons. It does still require ftirther elaboration to allow the operationalisation of 
the approach as those same things that give it strengths in evaluating well-being also 
make it harder to operationalise in a coherent fashion. 
" Sen, A. 'Capability and Well-being', p.271 
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Part II 
Chapter 4 - Welfare Economics 
Introduction 
Part o f the premise o f this paper, and the one that is explored in this chapter, is that 
economics and economic conceptualisations o f life have a significant influence on 
understandings and approaches to human well-being. It seems therefore appropriate to 
examine some of the economic concepts (and the assumptions behind them) that are 
now commonplace in society. 
Economics has made and w i l l continue to make a substantial contribution to questions 
of social policy and public life. However, this paper suggests, in certain areas it has 
come to dominate understandings o f human problems and has been asked to solve 
problems it is not designed to address. In short economics is concerned with the most 
efficient allocation of scarce resources and about choice subject to cons t ra in ts . I t is not 
designed as a comprehensive science o f well-being. 
Given the many definitions o f well-being in use and that in modem society the scope of 
economics is vast, it is necessary to say a bit more about the scope of this chapter. 
Modem economics covers many different areas o f l i fe that may have effects on well-
being. Whether it is intemational trade or environmental economics, fiscal or monetary 
policy, there are many potential lines of inquiry. This chapter though focuses on what is 
normally termed 'welfare economics' which is concemed with the role o f the economic 
causes that affect economic welfare directly and total welfare indirectly.^^ 
Layard, R and Walters, A .A , Microeconomic Theory, McGraw Hill, New York, 1987, p.3 
Pigou, A, C . The Economics of Welfare (4'*' ed.), MacmiUan, London, 1962, p. 14 
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However, before beginning to look at welfare economics it would be helpftil to make 
two sets o f distinctions within economics as a whole. The first is between micro and 
macro economics. Microeconomics is concerned with consumer behaviour, 
consumption, production, supply and demand. Macroeconomics is concerned with 
things on a larger scale or in aggregate; growth, government spending, international 
trade and inflation for example. Welfare economics is somewhat strange in this regard. 
It is normally considered part o f microeconomics given its focus on individuals but it 
also leads to conclusions about social welfare and society as a whole which might be 
considered more the domain o f macroeconomics. 
The second distinction, which w i l l be addressed in further detail, is between positive 
and normative economics. A rough distinction between them can be made by drawing 
the comparison between is and ought. Positive economics is concerned with what is and 
understanding and explaining it. Normative economics is concerned with what ought to 
be and how to bring it about. However, the separation between these two branches is not 
as clear cut as it may appear. This is for several reasons. 
First as Layard and Walters point out: "when discussing positive theory, one often 
wants to allude to its policy implications. So for many purposes it is best to establish the 
rules o f normative analysis first ." Second and o f crucial importance is that many 
'positive' models o f economic behaviour that give certain results are based on 
normative assumptions. This second reason w i l l be examined in the fol lowing chapter 
' Layard, R and Walters, A .A , Microeconomic Theory, p.xiv 
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looking at the normative assumptions implicit in many understandings o f welfare 
economics and consumer microeconomics. 
This distinction between positive and normative economics is important and a necessary 
first step to examining the role of economics because it allows us to challenge 
normative assumptions without challenging the objective assessments made. For 
example, the mathematical derivation o f a demand curve is different to challenging the 
assumptions about why consumers are never satiated. 
This chapter also looks at understandings o f welfare for both individuals and social 
groups as a whole. Several issues w i l l be raised with regard to devising a social welfare 
function. For example, issues regarding definitions o f welfare, comparisons of non-
identical individuals, whether or not 'welfare' is defined at a point in fime or over the 
life course^' are all aspects that need to be considered. 
This chapter follows on from Part 1 by exploring the operationalisation o f philosophical 
components found in Part I and in what way that has been done. The majority o f the 
chapter focuses on the role o f utilitarianism and the use of utility in economics. As 
Bonner notes: 
Utilitarian assumptions are so deep-seated in the social sciences, and particularly 
in economics, that it is often diff icul t to disentangle the deliberate from the 
accidental or unconscious. Bentham's guiding principle for social acts - the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number or, to be more accurate, the greatest 
happiness o f all whenever possible, and the sacrifice o f a little o f the happiness 
91 Bonner, J. Politics, Economics and Welfare, Wheatsheaf, Brighton, 1986, pp. 1-2 
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of the few for the greater happiness o f the many only when it is not - seems to 
lead naturally to the idea of maximising social welfare.'" 
The chapter begins by looking at the emergence of economic utility from Bentham's 
fel icif ic calculus through to modem welfare economics concerned with Pareto 
optimality and preference satisfaction. It then examines some of the central assumptions 
made by welfare economics, relating both to the individual and society as a whole. This 
is followed by an examination o f the outcomes o f welfare economics from both an 
individual and social perspective. Finally the chapter concludes by looking at the Hmits 
of welfare economics and some of the most common criticisms o f some of its key 
assumptions. 
The Emergence of Economic Utility 
One aspect o f economics that has had perhaps the most significant influence over 
debates on well-being is that o f economic utility. (The term economic utility is used here 
to distinguish it f rom the wider and different use of the term utility in other parts o f this 
paper.) The use o f economic utility can be traced all the way back to the emergence of 
neo-classical microeconomics in the 19'^  century, when people like Jevons, Menger and 
Walras "began paying systematic attention to preferences o f consumers, to exchange 
and to demand for commodities."'^ They needed a coherent way o f understanding and 
being able to predict consumer preferences, prices and supply and demand. They turned 
to utilitarianism and the work o f Bentham for this system. Bentham's felicific calculus 
provided a seemingly useful model for explaining consumer preferences and thus the 
concept o f economic utihty was formed. 
"^ Bonner, J . Politics. Economics and Welfare, p. 144 
Hausman, D. 'Introduction', Philosophy of Economics (3"' ed), Hausman, D (ed), Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p.26 
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It is worth then re-examining Bentham's model to see how and why the early neo-
classical economists used it as their basis for understanding economic utility. As Dormer 
describes it: 
Bentham's fel icif ic calculus is a method designed to measure the total quantity 
of pleasure and pain caused by an action. The method calls for a calculation of 
the quantity o f each pleasure and pain of every person whose interests are 
affected. [ . . . ] Since Benthamite scales are cardinal, units that can be added and 
multiplied and so aggregated are required for each of the dimensions. 
Bentham's method provided two very attractive concepts for those early economists. 
First, it did not require a normative definition of utility, it simply required individuals, 
in the economists' view, to be able to recognise how much utility or pleasure they 
would derive from a given action, almost always seen as the purchase o f a given good 
or service. No objective decisions were taken about what constituted this utility or 
pleasure, it was whatever a person desired and believed would give them pleasure. This 
was considered an advantage for the theory because each individual could decide for 
himself what he wanted (thus tying in with notions of hberalism) and yet at the same 
time it still enabled comparisons. This is because it was not what the individual wanted 
but how much he wanted it (and later how much he was wi l l ing to pay for it) that now 
defined utility. We begin to see then a move away from Benthamite notions o f utility as 
pleasure to economic notions o f utility as perceived pleasure a good would give. 
Secondly, Bentham's model provided cardinal values. That is a scale that could be 
aggregated rather than a simply ordinal scale which would simply indicate preference. 
Conner, W, 'Mill's Utilitarianism', p.268 
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This allowed utility to be measured not only for an individual, but to be compared 
across people as well. As was seen in Part 1 of this thesis, this was a perceived 
advantage for utilitarianism as a moral theory, but it was also perceived as an advantage 
for utility in economics. I f economic utility measures were comparable between people 
and could also be aggregated, then economics could not only devise laws and 
predictions for individuals but for societies as a whole. Thus, in this concept o f utility, 
were not only the foundations o f the microeconomics of individuals but also the 
beginnings o f social welfare economics. 
What is interesting to note with the emergence of economic utility is that it followed a 
more Benthamite trajectory rather than trying to incorporate some of the modifications 
suggested by M i l l . As Riley notes: 
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the 'marginalist revolution' 
involved a normative reaffirmation of the 'o ld ' Benthamite utilitarianism. 
Jevons, Edgeworth, and even Marshall paid short shrift to the modifications of 
utilitarianism proposed by M i l l . Rather, those neoclassical pioneers proposed 
more or less to operationalise a Benthamite art o f economics by precisely 
measuring and comparing units o f happiness across persons.^^ 
This is understandable because the modifications proposed by M i l l were a lot harder to 
operationalise than Bentham's. For example, Mi l l ' s concept o f a 'competent judge' 
provided an advantage in clarifying utility but would be almost impossible to put into 
practice in an economic sense because it would require individuals to be ' told ' how 
much satisfaction they should get from a particular good or service. Bentham's method 
Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.326 
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that left perceptions o f pleasure up to the individual and provided a seemingly easy 
method of measurement and comparison was thus preferred. 
Economics took its next leap onwards in the early 20'*^  century. In his book The 
Economics of Welfare, Pigou made some important elaborations of the earlier neo-
classical utility theory. Pigou was one o f the earliest economists to understand welfare 
economics primarily in terms of money and utility. As he states: 
The one obvious instrument of measurement available in social l i fe is money. 
Hence, the range of our inquiry becomes restricted to that part o f social welfare 
that can be brought directly or indirectly into relation with the measuring-rod o f 
money. This part of welfare may be called economic welfare.^^ 
In his book Pigou goes onto explain that money is an appropriate measure o f economic 
welfare because the price o f a good (or service) is a representation of the amount of 
desire and perceived satisfaction someone believes they are going to get from the 
good.^^ Interestingly then this definition o f one aspect of welfare, that o f economic 
welfare, is defined on the basis o f what economics can measure. Economic welfare was 
whatever money could measure and whatever money could measure was part of 
economic welfare. In other words the money demand price o f a good, in Pigouvian 
terms, can be seen as a measure o f the 'desiredness' (to use Pigou's term) or 'want 
satisfying power' o f the particular good in question. Because 'desiredness' was also 
seen to be equated with utility,''^ we have a formal statement o f the assumption o f 
money as a proxy or indicator or utility. 
Pigou, A, C . The Economics of Welfare (4'" ed), pp. 10-11 
Pigou, A, C . The Economics of Welfare (4"' ed), p.23 
" Pigou, A, C . The Economics of Welfare (4"^  ed), p.23 
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This view of money as a proxy for utility is also seen in the earlier work o f M i l l . M i l l 
argues that "a commodity's exchange value depends on both its 'effective' utility value 
(or use value) and its scarcity, where by 'effective' utility value is meant pleasure or 
preference-satisfaction of individuals with purchasing power, and by scarcity is meant 
'd i f f icul ty o f attainment' or costliness o f supply."^^ 
This assumption o f money as a measure o f utility is a central assumption o f economics. 
When coupled with the '"unverified probability' (according to Edgeworth) - that 
qualitative conclusions about the effect o f an economic cause upon economic welfare 
w i l l hold good also o f the effect on total welfare,""*" we get one o f the most basic 
assumptions o f economics. An increase in money w i l l lead to an increase, ceteris 
paribus, to an increase in total welfare. 
Pigou's work in welfare economics was modified in the 1930s onwards with work by 
Robbins, Hicks, Samuelson and Arrow. As Riley states: 
That normative program was later refined ( i f not rendered vacuous) by the 
'ordinalist revolution' of the 1930s and beyond, associated with Lord Robbins, 
Hicks, Samuelson, and Arrow. The upshot is that interpersonally comparable 
cardinal utility information has been abandoned in favour of non-comparable 
preference orderings, and Pareto efficiency has become the main (perhaps sole) 
surviving criterion of the economic art . '° ' 
Welfare economics underwent another modification in the post-World War Two period 
with the work o f Pareto. As Van den Ben and van Velthoven note: ''Paretian welfare 
Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.299 
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Pigou, A, C . The Economics of Welfare (4"^  ed), p.20 
Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.326 
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economics rejects interpersonal comparisons o f utility; utility can only be measured on 
an ordinal scale."' 
In other words, the cardinal approach taken by the original neo-classical economists 
(that was borrowed from Bentham) has been replaced with an ordinal approach that 
simply requires individuals to be able to 'rank' goods or services by the utility they 
would provide. This 'ordinalist revolufion' provided a major, i f subtle, shift in direction. 
Whereas before interpersonal comparisons o f utility were possible because or cardinal 
rankings, this is no longer possible with ordinal measures, each individual has to be 
treated separately. However, the link between money and utility is still retained because 
though utility information is now ordinal, consumer preferences, their 'desire' for a 
particular good can still be determined by the price they are wil l ing to pay to obtain it. 
What this means though is that whereas before (in theory) the accuracy of money as a 
proxy for utility could be examined, via cardinal utility units, that can no longer be 
done. In short, money is the only remaining comparable measure o f utility once only 
ordinal preferences exist and so money is the sole method on which inter-personal 
comparisons, and so social welfare can be made. These assumptions lead to two policy 
implications. First policy makers want to see whether a particular policy changes 
welfare, they can only assess this in monetary terms, the only change in welfare that can 
be measured is the change in money income. The second implication is that one sure 
fire way to increase total welfare is by increasing money income. 
The Assumptions of Economic Utility 
• Van den Ben, H and van Velthoven, B. Democracy and Welfare Economics (2 ed), CUP, 1993, p.30 
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This section lays out three assumptions foundational to welfare economics. These are: 
money as a measure o f utility; non-satiation; and the ceteris paribus assumption. Each 
is considered in turn before turning to the next section which looks at their implications 
in modem economic analysis. 
Money as a Measure of Utility 
Money as a measure o f utility (or in modem economics preference satisfaction) is 
perhaps that central assumption o f welfare economics. There are however others which 
when combined lead to many of the current assumptions o f welfare economics. 
The Concept of Non-satiation 
However Hausman provides a good summary that is worth considering here: 
Every option open to an individual results in a certain amount o f utility for that 
person. One can then clarify the notion o f rationality by maintaining that people 
act so as to maximize some consistent utility function. In addition, the 
neoclassical economists assumed that consumers are generally not satiated - that 
they w i l l always prefer a bundle x of commodities or services to another bundle 
i f X is unambiguously larger than j; . Nonsatiation is both a plausible first 
approximation, and it articulates the notion o f self-interest. A l l that matters to 
agents are the bundles o f commodities and services that they are giving up or 
receiving.'^^ 
Indeed the same point is made by Hausman and McPherson when they note: 
Hausman, D. 'Introduction', p.26 
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Without any general claims about the content o f people's preferences, very little 
can be predicted about how they w i l l choose, and, in the wake o f their choices, 
little can be said except that they chose as they preferred. Positive economics 
becomes contentful only when economists offer generalizations concerning what 
people prefer. The most important o f these generalizations is that people are 
materially self- interested, that they prefer more commodities to fewer, more 
wealth to less wealth. This generalization is so important, that one might 
reasonably think of it as a second general principle o f human nature to which 
most mainstream economists are committed. 
This is the assumption again of non-satiation. That is that "any bundle that has either 
more X and no less Y or more Y and no less X w i l l be p r e f e r r e d . I t is made by other 
authors as well with Nicholson saying: 
That spending all one's income is required for utility maximization is obvious. 
Because extra goods provide extra utility (there is no satiation) and because 
there is no other use for income, to leave any unspent would be to fail to 
maximize utihty. Throwing money away is not a utility-maximizing activity."*^ 
This point is repeated by Layard and Walters when explaining the related concept o f a 
downward sloping demand curve. They do so as follows: 
We now make one more assumption, from which we can deduce, with no further 
aid, one of the fundamental laws o f demand: that the (compensated) demand 
Hausman & McPherson, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative Economies', 
Philosophy of Economics Ci"^ ed), Hausman, D (ed), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, 
p.236 
Estrin, S. and Laidler, D. Introduction to Microeconomics (4''' Edition), Harvester Wheatsheaf, New 
York, 1995, p. 11 
Nicholson, W, Microeconomic Theory, Thomson, Ohio, 2005, p.95 
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curve is downward-sloping. The assumption is eminently reasonable. We simply 
assume that more of a good thing does you good. Put this way it appears like a 
tautology. In fact all that is ruled out is satiation. [ . . . ] In reality, o f course, some 
things, like leisure, are good up to a point, but may become a burden i f you have 
too much. But we assume that locally every commodity is a good or its negative 
is a good.'^^ 
The Ceteris Paribus Assumption 
Related to these assumptions was another that Pigou makes, which is now common to 
all economics, that of ceteris paribus. That is that when an economic change occurs all 
other things remain equal. As Pigou points out though: 
In other words, the effects o f economic causes are certain to be partially 
dependent on non-economic circumstances, in such ways that the same cause 
w i l l produce somewhat different economic effects according to the general 
character of, say, the polifical or religious conditions that prevail. So far as this 
kind o f dependence exists, it is obvious that causal propositions in economics 
can only be laid down subject to the condition that things outside the economic 
sphere either remain constant or, at least, do not vary beyond certain defined 
limits.'°« 
This concept o f ceteris paribus is still a central tenet o f economics today. While other 
factors are known to affect utility, they are not considered in an economic context as the 
following statement from a contemporary textbook indicates: 
'"^  Layard, R and Walters, A .A, Microeconomic Theory, p. 128 
Pigou, A, C . 7776 Economics of Welfare (4'^  ed), p.21 
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A common practice is to devote attention exclusively to choices among 
quantifiable options (for example, the relative quantities o f food and shelter 
bought, the number of hours worked per week, or votes among specific taxing 
formulas) while holding constant the other things that affect behaviour. This 
ceteris paribus (other things being equal) assumption is invoked in all economic 
analyses o f utility-maximizing choices so as to make the analysis o f choices 
manageable within a simplified setting. "^ ^ 
An important implication of this is that it allows economics to focus only on one part o f 
human welfare, that of consumption. However, because it has become, though its 
models and predictions, reasonably successful at this it has been argued that it has 
tended (not solely by economists themselves) to be elevated to an overall understanding 
on welfare. 
It is suggested then that these are the three central and key assumptions for welfare 
economics. That o f equating money to utility; assuming non-satiafion (or in economic 
terms a constant elasticity o f the marginal utility o f income); and holding all other 
things equal. It w i l l be shown in the next chapter how there are strong objections to both 
the theory and practice o f these assumptions. However, before those are raised, a further 
examination o f the outcomes of these assumptions in practice w i l l be conducted. 
The Outcomes of Economic Utility 
It may seem that the summary and descriptions o f the assumptions central to welfare 
economics are too simplistic and inaccurate to actually be used in contemporary 
Nicholson, W, Microeconomic Theory, p.71 
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economic theory. The purpose o f this section is to provide examples f rom current 
undergraduate textbooks on welfare economics that highlight in both verbal and 
mathematical terms the assumptions listed in the preceding section and how they are 
used today. This is done in two parts. First, regarding individual welfare and second 
regarding the welfare o f groups, normally termed social welfare. 
Individual Utility 
First it is worth noting that there is great desirability to adopting an understanding of 
individual welfare based on the assumptions stated earlier. This view provides a 
straightforward conception o f mankind that covers both motivation and outcome. 
Individuals are assumed to be rational utility maximisers who know what w i l l bring 
them satisfaction. 
As Van den Ben and van Velthoven helpfully summarise: 
According to Pigou the price o f a product which someone buys is an expression 
of what that person is wi l l ing to pay for it. Behind that lies the utility the good is 
offering him. For that reason Pigou considers the price as a measure of utility. 
Expressing all products in money terms by a multiplication o f their price and 
quantity and summing all these amounts yields a total amount which represents 
the welfare o f the individual ."° 
In other words, these economic assumptions allow economics both to examine 
motivation (because individuals are considered 'rational' which means they buy what 
' V a n den Ben, H and van Velthoven, B. Democracy and Welfare Economics (2"** ed), Cambridge 
University Press, 1993, p.24 
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they prefer) and to measure the outcome o f this motivation by examining the expected 
utility, derived from the price they were wil l ing to pay. 
Next we see that the shift f rom cardinality to ordinality made by economists is still 
understood today. The quote below highlights the shift to ordinality and preference 
orderings. 
There is no need for cardinal measurement o f utility in order to explain 
behaviour on our theory, since all we are concerned with is preference orderings. 
So even i f utility is a cardinal variable (like temperature), which is impossible to 
prove scientifically, we can forget about this for purposes o f positive 
economics.'" 
It is also interesting to note that happiness is often (though not always) used 
synonymously with utility in contemporary economic textbooks. This below quote is 
also o f great interest because it lays out (in mathematical form) those assumptions made 
in the previous section. 
We shall suppose that the happiness o f A depends only on how much x and v he 
gets. I f he were altruistic, his happiness would also vary directly with what B 
got; i f he were envious, it would vary inversely with what B got. Adding such 
interdependences does not alter the basic structure o f the problem, but for 
simplicity we omit them. Thus A has a happiness, or ufi l i ty, ftinction u that tells 
us how well o f f he is, depending on his consumption o f products x and v; so 
does B. 
u^ = u ^ x ^ y ^ ) u = u V , y ' ) 
"' Layard, Rand Walters, A.A, Microeconomic Theory, p. 126 
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Once again, more o f x or y leads to more happiness. 112 
At the end of that quote we have perhaps the fundamental assumption o f welfare 
economics. More income allows the consumption o f more goods (which goods w i l l vary 
by individuals) and that higher consumption w i l l lead to greater utility and so greater 
happiness. 
in short, utility (or happiness) is maximised when the maximum quantity o f goods at 
given prices is bought with the given money income. That is, the amount o f money 
directly determines the amount o f utility available to an individual. Put another way, i f 
policy makers wish to raise an individual's utility the most straight-forward way of 
doing this is by increasing their money income. 
The final point regarding individual utility worth noting is that part of these economic 
assumptions assumes a diminishing marginal utility for each good. That is, that the 
more a consumer has o f something the less extra utility w i l l be gained f rom each 
additional unit. This seems like a reasonable assumption and has been borne out when 
analysing consumer's actual behaviour. 
However, what is recognised as being possible but is not assumed is the elasticity o f 
diminishing marginal utility o f income as a whole. That is, the more money you have 
the less utility it yields to you. The micro-economic models above shows that 
consumer's 'convert' money into utility through the satisfaction o f their desires, 
' L a y a r d , R and Walters, A .A, Microeconomic Theory, p.5 
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provided by the purchase o f certain goods. Economics though assumes this conversion 
rate is constant, no matter how much (or little) money you have. In other words, a 
person w i l l get as much relative satisfaction (or utility) from consuming goods when 
their income is £1 mil l ion pounds as when it's £10,000. 
In summary then we see that because utility is only measured ordinally and not 
cardinally the marginal utility o f money income is not considered relevant and cannot 
be calculated."^ 
Social Welfare 
The second related but distinct development is that o f social welfare. Before looking at 
some of the expressions o f social welfare it is necessary to lay out some overall issues. 
First there is some argument about whether it is even possible to develop a social 
welfare function. Social welfare is the welfare of more than one but how many more 
and does that even matter? In economics these questions are normally wrapped up with 
the choice o f a particular social welfare function. These functions in turn are not simply 
mathematical formulae but in themselves embody certain normative assumptions. As 
Layard and Walters note: "any welfare function is ultimately a value judgement.""* Or 
as Bonner notes: "There are no purely objective standards o f welfare measurement.""^ 
There are also several different value decisions that need to be taken, and these w i l l be 
examined in more detail when particular welfare functions are studied. However, 
another general one, not limited solely to economics but nonetheless relevant is that o f 
whose welfare is being considered. That is, is the social welfare simply the aggregation 
' Estrin, S. and Laidler, D. Introduction to Microeconomics 4"" Edition, p. 17 
Layard, R and Walters, A .A, Microeconomic Theory, p.4 
""^  Bonner, J . Politics. Economics and Welfare, p.3 
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of the welfare o f all the individuals involved, or is there a different welfare for the group 
as a whole. Either of these direcfions leads to other issues and again this w i l l be 
considered in more depth later in this section. Also o f relevance to understandings o f 
social welfare is the nature or utility being considered, is it cardinal or ordinal? These 
questions are all o f importance because as Bonner points out: 
The concept o f social welfare is frequently used in judgements about the effects 
of changes in social, political and economic circumstances upon groups of 
individuals, and as the basis for policy prescripfions to deal with the social, 
political and economic problems that face these groups."^ 
This issue o f how utility is measured (whether with cardinal or ordinal values) is crucial 
also because of the claims and conclusions that can be drawn depending on the method 
taken. I f utility is cardinal for example, and can be measured and compared across 
individuals then according to Bonner, "utilitarians have a powerful and consistent index 
of social welfare in all possible social states.""^ What is necessary though for this 
argument is that for there to be equality, all individuals must convert money into utility 
at the same rate, (we see a similar argument with utilitarianism also). Otherwise "once it 
is admitted that some individuals may be better at converting income into utility than 
others, maximising aggregate ufi l i ty leads to inequality."'"* 
Another social welfare function (or approach) that relies on cardinal utility measures is 
an application o f the welfare understandings in Rawls' Theory of Justice. As we have 
seen in Part 1, Rawls argued for a 'difference principle' that sought to ensure any 
welfare changes would benefit the least well-off. "The application of this welfare 
'"^  Bonner, J . Politics, Economics and Welfare, pp. 1-2 
Bonner, J . Politics. Economics and Welfare, p. 149 
Bonner, J . Politics. Economics and Welfare, p. 153 
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criterion requires an interpersonal comparison o f utility as well in order to be able to 
determine which person is the worst off. The idea, however, that interpersonal 
comparison o f ufili ty might be possible meets with many objections among 
economists.""^ 
On the other hand i f utility is only ordinal, that is i f each individual can rank their 
preferences but no inter-personal ufi l i ty comparisons can be made, then the only way to 
develop a social welfare funcfion is by an aggregafing o f individual welfare evaluafions. 
This is the form taken by Pareto welfare approaches, which is now the most common 
approach to examining social w e l f a r e . M o r e crucially also, as Van den Ben and van 
Velthoven note: "Parefian welfare economics does not have a ful ly specified social 
welfare function on offer. But it does dispose o f a decision rule which makes it possible 
to avoid judging the distribution of utility and to draw conclusions which are valid for 
all distribufions of uf i l i ty . " ' " ' 
However, the approach o f aggregafing individuals' welfare has been criticised by other 
economists. The below quote from Knight helpfully summarises the criticisms while at 
the same fime addressing the quesfion considered earlier about whose welfare is being 
considered and what exactly is social or societal welfare. Knight notes: 
Society cannot accept individual ends and individual means as data or as the 
main objectives o f its own policy. In the first place, they simply are not data, but 
are historically created in the social process itself and are inevitably affected by 
social policy. Secondly, society cannot be even relafively indifferent to the 
workings of the process. To do so would be ultimately destructive of society and 
Van den Ben, H and van Velthoven, B. Democracy and Welfare Economics (2"'' ed), p.30 
' Van den Ben, H and van Velthoven, B. Democracy and Welfare Economics (2"'' ed), p.30 
Van den Ben, H and van Velthoven, B. Democracy and Welfare Economics (2"'' ed), p.30 
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individual ahke. This conclusion is strongly reinforced by the fact that the 
immediate interest o f the individual is largely competitive, centred in his own 
social-advancement relative to other individuals. In such a contest it is the 
function of the public authority to enforce the rules impartially, and still more to 
make such rules as would tend to keep the 'game' on the highest possible level. 
To this end it must maintain a standpoint distinctly different from the interest in 
which the individual, always more conscious o f conflicts of interests than o f 
community o f interest with the social body as a whole, tends to be absorbed.'"" 
Economists' work on developing social welfare functions was much complicated by the 
work o f Arrow. Arrow mathematically demonstrated that aggregating individual's 
choices into a social welfare function was impossible i f certain reasonable conditions 
were made. As Bonner notes: "Arrow's conclusion is that there is no way of 
amalgamating individual orderings into a collective choice which satisfies all five 
conditions. [ . . . ] By trying to obey the rules o f collective rationality, unrestricted 
domain, the Pareto principle, and the independence o f irrelevant alternatives, they fall 
foul o f the rule of non-dictatorship."'^^ 
In mainstream contemporary economics then, there are a variety of different welfare 
functions that are considered. However, given the scope of the task involved, that is the 
consideration of all the respective welfare functions o f a group of often heterogeneous 
and disparate individuals, economics is required to make some very large 
generalisations. As Layard and Walters note: 
"" ICnight, F. 'Economics and Human Action', Philosophy of Economics (3 ed), Hausman, D (ed), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 105 
'"^  Bonner, J . Politics, Economics and Welfare, p.62 
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Economic policy usually affects so many people that some fairly crude 
assumptions are needed. For many purposes it may be adequate to assume that 
everybody has the same utility o f income function u(y). I f this utility function is 
concave (diminishing marginal utility o f income), then the new welfare function 
W(y^,y^) is symmetric and strictly concave. Thus i f A is richer than B, any 
transfer o f income from A to B (with total income constant) raises welfare. This 
condition is known as the principle of transfer and seems a reasonable 
requirement o f any welfare function. The more egalitarian one is, the more the 
isowelfare curves approach right angles. By contrast i f one is indifferent to 
distribution, the curves are straight lines (W = y'^ + y^) and one simply 
maximises the gross national product, i.e. follow the Kaldor criteria."'"'' "Thus 
the equity aspects o f policies have always to be considered as well as their 
efficiency aspects."' 
Thus it can be seen that welfare is conceived almost exclusively in terms o f utility and 
that this, while having varying approaches, is normally conceived in an individual way. 
The philosophical approaches o f utilitarianism and justice as fairness are considered by 
economists but on the whole rejected because of their need for inter-personal 
comparisons o f utility. Paretian welfare and the ordinalist revolution has meant that now 
utility is conceived in terms o f preference satisfaction exclusively. This leads to two 
general conclusions about social welfare, irrespective o f the particular fianction used. 
First, i f consumers' real income is increased then they w i l l be able to satisfy more o f 
their preferences than before and this w i l l result in a higher level of utility. In this first 
124 
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Layard, R and Walters, A .A , Microeconomic Theory, pp.47-48 
Layard, R and Walters, A . A , Microeconomic Theory, p.50 
66 
conclusion then we see the logic behind the supremacy of economic growth as the 
primary aim of public policy. 
The second conclusion is that consumers are better able to prefer i f there are more 
things to choose from. Here then we see the importance o f choice. The second 
conclusion leads logically to the view that the greater the choice the higher the 
likelihood o f preferences being satisfied and so the higher the overall utility. As we saw 
earlier in this section neither of these conclusions address distributional or equity 
concerns, but, i f total utility, via higher consumption (via higher income) and greater 
choice is happening this is increasing the social welfare of society as a whole. 
The Limits of Welfare Economics 
In the previous sections an overview of economic utility, including its emergence and 
development f rom utilitarianism, its key assumptions and their implication and finally 
what effect this had on practical applications today was discussed. However, these 
economic assumptions have come under increasing criticism and scrutiny from a variety 
of quarters. Some indeed have been economists who have been arguing for a different 
conception o f welfare or well-being. This section looks at some of the challenges and 
criticisms o f traditional welfare economics in both theory and practice. 
As was noted in the introduction to this chapter there is a distinction drawn in 
economics between positive and normative economics. However, as was noted, this 
distinction is not always clear. One important aspect o f this overlap involves the 
necessity to make normative assumptions when creating positive models. Or to put it 
another way, the mathematical models that 'predict' certain outcomes in economics are 
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many times themselves based on certain assumptions. These normative assumptions 
then play a crucial role in the outcome from the positive model. 
Hausman and McPherson for example highlight several normative economic 
assumptions, oftentimes presented as fact, that have crucial relevance to the theoretical 
outcomes of many aspects of positive microeconomics. These include the focus on 
individuals, conceiving welfare in a purely economic and individualistic sense and 
measuring welfare by accepting the way the market evaluates things via prices.'"* 
The Focus on Individuals, Economic Welfare and Prices 
The majority o f economics tends to use the individual as the basic unit of analysis. The 
individual is assumed to be a rational person who seeks to maximise his own utility. '"^ 
The individual's behaviour is assumed to be based entirely on this motive, to maximise 
his own utility subject to his budget constraint. This assumption o f individual behaviour 
is contested though as Veblen points out: 
Not only is the individual's conduct hedged about and directed by his habitual 
relations to his fellows in the group, but these relations, being o f an institutional 
character, vary as the instimtional scheme varies. The wants and desires, the end 
and aim, the ways and means, the amplitude and drif t o f the individual's conduct 
are functions o f an institutional variable that is o f a highly complex and wholly 
unstable character.'"^ 
Hausman, D. & McPherson, M. 'The Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative 
Economies', p.228 
Van den Ben, H and van Velthoven, B. Democracy and Welfare Economics (2"'' ed), p.20 
'•^ Veblen, T. 'The Limitations of Marginal Utility', Philosophy of Economics (3"" ed), Hausman, D (ed), 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008, p. 136 
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It is worth noting that the assumption o f all individuals being independent utility 
maximises is highly contested. For example Knight makes the following point: 
The actual interests or desires expressed in economic behaviour are to an 
overwhelming extent social in genesis and in content; consequently they cannot 
be described apart from a system of social relations which itself can not be 
treated in purely objective, factual terms.'^^ 
Hausman and McPherson go on to show how mainstream economics makes choices 
about how it understands certain concepts. For example they show that in economics the 
outcome that matters for individuals is not freedom, rights or justice but welfare and 
that welfare is understood as the satisfaction o f preferences, not as happiness or an 
objective good like health, achievements or personal relationships. 
Further they argue that economic welfare cannot be separated from other aspects o f 
welfare. They go on to note that "welfare economics depends not only on a specific 
view of welfare but also on the view that inquiries into welfare can be separated f rom 
inquiries into freedom, rights, equality, and justice. [ . . . ] The notion that there is a 
separate dimension o f economic evaluation is, as we shall see, questionable."'^' Indeed, 
Pigou, considered by some to be the founder o f modem welfare economics, himself 
went further and noted that "an economic cause may affect non economic welfare in 
ways that cancel its effect on economic welfare."' 
In fact Hausman and McPherson go further and argue that in contrast to utilitarianism: 
Knight, F. 'Economics and Human Action', p.106 
Hausman, D. & McPherson, M. 'The Philosophical Foundations of Mainsn-eam Normative 
Economies', p.230 
Hausman & McPherson, 'The Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative Economics',p.240 
' Pigou, A, C . The Economics of Welfare (4"^  ed), p. 12 
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Mainstream welfare economics, which was in fact influenced by utilitarianism, 
at first glance appears to fol low utilitarianism in reducing ethical individualism -
which is a plausible and humane doctrine - to the more dubious view that only 
individual welfare is o f intrinsic moral importance.'" 
We saw earlier in the chapter that welfare economics tends to equate utility with price 
through the medium of value. Individuals are consumers who value utility based on 
their willingness to pay. Thus as we saw price becomes a proxy for utility. However, the 
assumption that the price reflects the perceived amount o f utility a good w i l l provide is 
just that - an assumption, it is not even held by all economists. For example Knight 
makes the fol lowing point: 
Thus not only do men desire more or less distinctly f rom valuing, but they desire 
because they value and also value without desiring. Indeed, the bulk of human 
valuations, in connection with truth, beauty, and morals, are largely or altogether 
independent o f desire for any concrete thing or result.'^'* 
There is the assumption as we have seen in economics that 'value' is equal to 'price' 
which is equal to 'expected satisfaction' or 'u t i l i ty ' obtained f rom the purchase o f the 
good in question. However, as has hopefully been demonstrated these concepts are not 
necessarily identical. 
Philosophical Influences 
It is hoped that this brief overview of the development of economic utility and welfare 
has demonstrated how the different philosophical approaches described in Part I have 
impacted upon operational understandings o f welfare economics. As we have seen 
Hausman, D. & McPherson, M. 'The Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative 
Economies', pp.237-238 
Knight, F. 'Economics and Human Action', p.102 
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though, the operationalisation o f these philosophical approaches has in some respects 
fundamentally altered their underpinnings. 
Utilitarianism and Welfare Economics 
Considering first utilitarianism we see that, as Riley notes: 
Even from a Benthamite perspective, modem 'ordinalist utilitarianism' 
represents a significant shift of emphasis in the utilitarian tradifion. In effect, 
Bentham's faith in a utilitarian harmony of abundance, security, subsistence, and 
equality has been replaced by a virtually exclusive focus on efficiency and 
growth, with little concern for conflicts between these values and others 
(including basic rights and distributive justice).'^^ 
Also o f note is the divergent view regarding economic growth. Welfare economics 
would suggest that indefinite growth is desirable, increasing peoples' welfare. However, 
earlier utilitarian writers like M i l l in fact made arguments for a stationary state, that is a 
level above which mankind's activities would be devoted to 'higher' pursuits than just 
economic production.'^^ Thus, by defining utility solely in terms of satisfaction and 
indirectly prices, modem welfare economics has severely limited its approach to human 
welfare and as Riley argues above, has diverged quite substantially f rom the 
philosophical basis on which it began. 
Rawls Theory of Justice 
'^ ^ Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.326 
Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.314 
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Despite the intention o f Rawls to provide an alternative conception to util i tarianism,'" 
there are some similarities with respect to social welfare functions i f not with respect to 
the method of measurement. Bonner provides a very helpful summary o f the different 
issues involved: 
The distinction drawn by Rawls between basic and non-basic liberties and his 
reward o f priority to the first over the second, and to both over social and 
economic inequalities is not merely a mark o f his concern for justice rather than 
social welfare; it is also a neat solution to the problems o f reconciling utility 
with non-utility information. Most approaches to social welfare exclude 
considerations of social l ife like freedom and justice (and beauty) because they 
are supposed to be intractable. Freedom and justice do not have a price like 
material commodities and services, and their relationship to personal utility or 
welfare is neither simple nor direct.'^* 
In short then it can be seen that Rawls' distinction between basic and non-basic liberties 
avoids some of the pitfalls o f a utilitarian maximising approach while also allowing the 
inclusion o f non-utility information. However, this means that actual operationalisation 
and measurement o f these non-utility dimensions o f information is more problematic 
than a purely economic approach. 
Sen's Capability Approach 
Sen's capability approach provides another alternative to utility based measures but 
does so on a more fundamental level. By defining an entirely different measure, that of 
functionings and capabilities, rather than utility based approaches. Sen enables a much 
Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice, p.3 
Bonner, J . Politics, Economics and Welfare, p. 178 
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broader conception o f welfare or well-being to be considered. He also identifies the 
issue o f valuation as a fundamental one that should not be assumed to be indicated by 
preference satisfaction or the market.'^^ Perhaps Sen's other main contribution to re-
evaluations o f welfare economics is his critique of the 'tyranny of required 
completeness'. As he says: 
It is worth emphasizing that for valuation to have content, it need not necessarily 
have to generate complete orderings. The tyranny o f 'required completeness' has 
had a disastrous effect on many other problems in economic measurement (e.g., 
inter-personal comparisons, indexing real income), offering us a false choice 
between silence and babbling. Natural partial orders are either rejected as 
incomplete, or forced into arbitrary completeness, raising difficulties that need 
not have arisen, it is important to recognise that many economic and social 
relations are inherently partial and incomplete. Evaluation o f well-being can 
plausibly be seen as belonging to that category.'""^ 
Gasper provides perhaps the most helpful summary o f Sen's contribution to re-
evaluations o f welfare economics arguing: 
Analytically, Sen has critiqued the conflation in modem welfare economics o f 
numerous categories (self-interest = preference = choice = satisfaction = W B ) 
which has been exacerbated by giving several of them the name 'ut i l i ty ' . He has 
pluralized our conceptual armoury for discussion o f 'human advantage', as we 
noted earlier and w i l l elaborate. He recognizes, for example, how satisfaction 
can come both from one's own situation and f rom others' situations. At the same 
Sen, A. Commodities and Capabilities, p.32 
Sen, A. Commodities and Capabilities, p.31 
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time, he stresses that interpretations of ambiguous ideas 'must try to capture that 
ambiguity rather than hide or eliminate i t ' (1993: 34).'"' 
We see then both similarities and differences between aspects of the operational 
approaches and their philosophical underpinnings. Indeed, the case o f welfare 
economics perhaps most helpfully highlights the need for the link between 
philosophical conceptions and operational approaches to always remain a strong one. 
Conclusion 
It is hoped that these sections have shown how some of the key assumptions about 
welfare economics emerged and their centrality to the operationalisation of welfare 
economics. It would perhaps be helpful to briefly highlight some of the key points. 
First, early economists drew on the work o f Bentham and his felicific calculus to derive 
a 'ut i l i ty function' , that is a model o f individual desires based on perceived pleasure. 
This theory was further developed by Pigou in the early 1900s in two important ways. 
First, Pigou redefined utility not as perceived pleasure but as 'desiredness' (to use his 
own words), or perceived want-satisfying power. Secondly and perhaps more 
importantly Pigou made explicit the link between desire and money. Money was the 
only available measuring rod and so also acted as a medium for measuring utility. The 
assumption was made that the amount of money an individual was wil l ing to pay for a 
certain good was indicative of the amount o f utility or pleasure they believed they 
would derive from it. 
Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.51 
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Further modifications to these basic welfare tenets were made but did not dramatically 
alter these fundamental assumptions. As has been shown, modifications included 
replacing desiredness with preference satisfaction and a move away from any measures 
o f cardinality to ordinality. This meant absolute numbers could not be allocated to 
specific utility variables but that now utility simply meant preference ordering. 
Individuals now knew not how much utility a good might provide, but just that it would 
provide more than another. This however is not the whole story. 
As was highlighted earlier one o f the advantages o f the original utility fijnction 
developed by early economists was that it allowed inter-personal comparisons. I f 
ordinality replaced cardinality this would seem to be no longer possible. However, 
because o f the work of Pigou linking money with util i ty, economists still had a 
comparable measure. In short, money became the proxy for utility. 
Why is this so important? The answer lies that in while these developments and 
definitions were going on within economics, utility was still understood by many to 
embody happiness. Thus, while economics may have adapted the definition a common 
definition was still that o f happiness. Thus when taken together it could be suggested 
that money was a measure o f how much happiness a good or service might provide. 
In other words, modem welfare economics has replaced the concept (proposed by the 
early neo-classical economists) o f any concept of a cardinal scale and measurable uti l i ty 
with the concept of non-comparable preference orderings that yield satisfaction. That is 
utility is no longer a ' thing' that can be measured but simply a way of ranking choices 
according to an individual's preference. The goal is still to maximise utility, but utility 
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now means as much satisfaction as anything else. Welfare is promoted when consumers 
are satisfied. The final development o f utility has then been the fairly general 
acceptance in economics that preference satisfaction can be measured by willingness to 
142 
pay. 
What is fascinating about the social welfare side is that it is subject in many ways to 
some of the same criticisms o f utilitarianism as a moral philosophy. We saw in Part 1 
that one aspect o f utilitarianism for early writers (including Bentham) was that it 
provided an agenda for acfion by specifying the taking o f decisions in light of 
maximising the overall happiness. As we saw, i f the happiness o f each individual could 
be measured and aggregated then decisions for society could be taken in such a way to 
maximise the total happiness for society. This concept encountered many criticisms 
including that it neglected distributional effects and potentially justified taking utility 
away from some under a certain action i f more would be obtained by another. 
As we saw this was called the 'greatest happiness principle' and while it still has some 
proponents, now not as many would probably ascribe to it. Returning to economics in 
this chapter we saw how neo-classical economists appropriated the idea o f Bentham's 
fel if ic calculus to create a utility function. While there has been the development of 
preference satisfaction as the understanding o f utility rather than happiness the 
ftindamental assumption is still the same as the greatest happiness principle. As we have 
seen in economics income is seen as a proxy for preference satisfaction which in turn is 
seen as a proxy for utility. In short then the same thinking that produced the greatest 
happiness principle is still alive today in the form of welfare economics. I f original 
Hausman, D. & McPherson, M. T h e Philosophical Foundations of Mainstream Normative 
Economies', p.233 
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utilitarianism believed the morally best course was to pursue the greatest good, 
irrespective for the individual, welfare economics proposes much the same thing. The 
greatest income possible is morally best, even i f there are distributional issues. 
Thus in conclusion, it is suggested that economic welfare has emerged as perhaps the 
dominant operational approach to welfare at the moment, and it is far from perfect. 
Indeed it is argued that in its operational modifications over the years it has lost a lot of 
the philosophical underpinnings that it once had. This has left it conceptually weaker 
than would otherwise be the case. This conceptual weakness has been more widely 
recognised more recently and alternative approaches have been developed. These face 
their own problems also, but to borrow a concept from economics, there is greater 
efficiency when there is competition. Economics' monopoly on human welfare has 
come to the end with the entrance into this 'market' o f significant competition. 
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Chapter 5 - Objective Well-being 
Introduction 
After having considered the method of operationalisation of well-being through welfare 
economics, this chapter focuses on what is sometimes termed 'objective well-being' 
(OWB). While this may not be the most helpful term to describe this particular 
approach, it is a commonly used one and so w i l l be used in this chapter. 
While it is a simplification, one method of definition o f objective well-being is that used 
by Gasper. It is based on measures of non-feeling aspects rather than subjective feelings 
based approaches.''*'' OWB measures are also useful to analyse because they are built on 
an operational framework. They do not face some of the same challenges to 
operationalisation as other approaches because they are based on measured data. 
However, as this chapter w i l l examine, this does not mean they are better at describing 
well-being but simply contribute certain dimensions o f understanding. As Gasper notes 
objective well-being is sfill a normative concept because "we measure what is proposed 
as having value. The question is how well argued and/or widely accepted those values 
„ ™ " 1 4 4 
are. 
Measures o f objective well-being are found most commonly in national measures used 
in international development. Objective well-being is concemed with defining and 
measuring well-being based on certain key indicators which themselves can be 
measured. As McGill ivray notes: "While one can question whether such attribution is 
'""^  Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', p.33-34 
Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', p.35 
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always valid, achieved well-being measures are seen as important tools, used in the 
design and evaluation o f policies, both domestic and intemafional."'''^ 
Objective well-being measurements have strong grounds for claiming a place in 
operational understandings o f well-being. As we w i l l see they offer a wider 
understanding than that provided by a traditional welfare economics approach while at 
the same time relying on empirical evidence to make their assessments. It is 
understandable then why those who have seen the shortcomings o f a solely economic 
approach, yet who appreciate its empirical bent and comparable conclusions have 
looked to objective well-being to ' f i l l in the gaps' that are left by economic approaches. 
It is easy to see then why "empirical research has proposed a number o f composite 
indexes intended to measure multi-dimensional well-being, especially at the level o f 
countries. At least twenty composite indices have received international attention in the 
last four decades."'^^ 
We saw in the last chapter some of the assumptions and outcomes o f an economic 
approach to well-being and also the limitations f rom an economic perspective. This 
chapter then begins by looking at the relationship between income and objective well-
being. This is followed by a look at some of the current methods of measuring 
'objective well-being', their methodology and conclusions. 
McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', p.l 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and Future, 
Human Well-being: Concept and Measurement, McGillivray, M. (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 
2007, p.l 13 
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The Relationship Between Income and Objective Well-Being 
Despite still being the most common measure of well-being, GDP has been heavily 
criticised for its shortcomings in both development and well-being terms.'""^ As 
Dowrick goes on to point out: "international GDP comparisons make no allowance for 
environmental differences, for resource depletion, for leisure, for household production 
of goods and services, for black market activities or for external costs and benefits 
associated with production and consumption."'''*' Indeed, this reticence to rely on GDP 
as an indicator o f progress can be seen in the shift f rom an economic growth approach 
to a wider 'development' approach in discussions about international development. For 
example, whereas thirty years ago the focus for international development organisations 
was more on raising GDP and economic growth there is now an acceptance that a wider 
approach is needed, witnessed by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by 
world leaders. 
Alongside this widening o f what constitutes development is the increasing recognition 
that national income is not just a variable to be maximised. Indeed, "Easterlin postulated 
that absolute income levels matter up to the point at which basic needs are met, and 
beyond that relative incomes are more important."'"*^ Attempts, like the Generalized 
Lorenz Curve (which takes the standard Lorenz curve and scales it by the mean income 
of the distribution) were made to enhance the GDP indicators by trying to measure 
equality as well as efficiency. '^° However, as McGilhvray goes on to note: "Limitations 
of income per capita as an indicator o f human well-being are well-known and often 
Dowrick, S. 'Income Based Measures of Average Well-being', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.65 
Dowrick, S. 'Income Based Measures of Average Well-being', p.65 
McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', p.l 1 
McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', Human Well-being: Concept 
and Measurement, McGillivray (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.7 
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repeated. I f we accept that well-being is multidimensional, then it at best captures only 
one o f its many dimensions."'^' It was out of this trend towards examining other 
dimensions that conceptualisations of objective well-being emerged. 
This recognition of the shortcoming of relying solely on income-based measures o f 
well-being has led to the emergence of other aggregate indicators. The emergence o f 
these indicators, both individual and aggregate, of objective well-being arose largely out 
o f the belief that well-being involved more than simply income and wealth. As Gasper 
notes: 
Some major indicators o f objective wellbeing show little or no improvement 
beyond middle-income level. People cannot become literate twice or, at present, 
live ever longer. And in some respects there can be deterioration: mobility can 
decline in megalopoli, and stress levels, suicide and mental illness levels appear 
often to grow. Input levels are not reliable proxies for describing or valuing the 
contents of a life. The input-output relationships vary greatly, according to 
users' skills and needs and according to the conditions in the particular time and 
place. '" 
Human Development Index 
One of the most common aggregate measures of human well-being used today'^^ is the 
Human Development Index (HDI) published by the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). The HDI was designed to provide a wider approach to development 
and well-being that was given in an analysis of GDP. Indeed, this was part o f the 
McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', p.5 
Gasper, D. 'Subjective and Objective Weil-Being in Relation to Economic Inputs: Puzzles and 
Responses', Review of Social Economy, Vol. 63, No. 2, pp. 174-206 (2005), p. 184 
Harkness, S. 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement - McGillivray (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.90 
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argument of the UNDP that "human development and not economic growth, should be 
the objective o f development policy." '^ "^  
The H D l includes three different indicators: l ife expectancy, education and income. 
However the purpose of the H D I was wider than that as McGillivray & Noorbakhsh 
note: 
The UNDP has also sought to provide a precise definition of human 
development, which is analogous to human well-being, linking it to the design 
o f the H D l . The first Human Development Report noted: Human development is 
a process o f enlarging people's choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long 
and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard o f living.'^^ 
We see in the analysis o f the HDl two important points. First, that development (and so 
also well-being) ought to be understood more in terms o f enlarging people's choices 
than simply providing access to financial resources. Second, though the H D I may have 
similarities with the capability approach, it operationalises Sen's concept in a particular 
way. It identifies three key capabilities it sees as universal (otherwise inter-country 
comparison would not be possible); those o f life, education and standard of l iving and 
aggregates their indicators. As we saw in Part I Chapter 3, Sen's capability approach 
has faced criticism due to the perceived difficulties in operationalising it. Here though 
in the H D I we see an attempt to operationalise the approach based around three key 
areas that can be measured based on available data. 
Harkness, S. 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', p.88 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and Future, 
p . l l5 
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There is also the associated question about what is actually being measured. I f the H D l 
is measuring certain valuable capabilities o f individuals, is it really a better assessment 
o f the capabilities than income is alone? Certainly Sen would (and does) argue that a 
capabilities approach is fundamentally different to a solely income based approach, but 
is the actual data being used (in this case child mortality, l ife expectancy, literacy etc.) 
actually best suited to measuring capabilities? In other words, i f the H D I is taken (in 
some form) to be measuring capabilities; is that premise altered at all (and i f so how) by 
the choice o f data that is used? 
For example, research by McGillivray and Noorbakhsh shows that H D I correlations to 
individual indicators vary quite substantially by group of countries. In developed 
countries the Pearson correlation coefficients of life expectancy and educational 
attainment to income (PPP GDP) were 0.794 and 0.765 respectively whereas for the 
least developed countries correlates were 0.386 and -0.044. Supporting this data are the 
coefficients for the H D I as a whole. Regarding income and the HDI , coefficients were 
0.924 for high income countries and only 0.567 for low income countries. In other 
words income level was a strong predictor o f the H D I level in high-income countries, 
but a (relatively) weaker one in low-income countries. While this is only one study, its 
results seem to highlight a far stronger argument for composite indexes being used in 
low-income countries rather than higher ones.'^^ 
It also raises the point that different measures can (and perhaps should) be used in 
different circumstances to measure the same capabilities. I f there are indeed similarities 
in many respects between the capabilities approach and the H D I there are also some 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and Future, 
p. 124 
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differences. The main one lies in the silence of the H D l on issues o f freedom. This is 
looked at in detail in a later section o f this chapter but it is worth noting that given the 
emphasis Sen's capability approach places on agency and how capabilities are different 
f rom functionings that an attempt to operationalise the capability approach without 
including some assessment o f freedom o f agency only in fact sees one half o f the coin. 
In concluding the assessment o f the H D I though it should be remembered that this was 
one o f the first and most widespread attempts to signify with a robust empirical 
approach that there is "more to well-being achievement than improvements in incomes 
alone." '" 
Basic Needs and Basic Capabilities Approach 
This was pioneered first in thinking about international development and in opposition 
to a solely income based approach. It emerged as a response to the question of why 
poverty was not being alleviated as incomes increased. As Harkness points out "the 
basic needs approach placed emphasis on the fact that the poor require access to certain 
basic goods and services, and that income may not be a necessary or sufficient condition 
for their provision."'^* It is worth noting that this approach diverged from economics 
which would argue that increasing incomes would allow the poor to purchase what they 
needed. 
In examining the basic needs approach one of the first questions that arises is regarding 
what needs are termed as 'basic'. This is a recognised first issue and authors who use 
this approach normally begin by providing a reasoning both for a basic needs approach 
and arguments for the inclusion of certain needs. This section now looks at some o f the 
different descriptions of basic needs and the reasoning behind using these particular 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F . Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and Future, 
p.l27 
Harkness, S. 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', p.88-89 
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ones. First we examine an approach to basic needs that emphasises their universahty. As 
McGillivray helpfully summarises: 
"Doyal and Gough conclude that universal needs do exist, and that vectors o f 
basic and intermediate needs and degrees of need satisfaction can be identified. 
They identify two universal basic needs: physical health and autonomy of 
agency, the latter defined as the capacity to initiate and act through the 
formulation of aims and beliefs (Doyal and Gough 1991)."'^^ 
Here we see then the priority placed on objective measures o f well-being (in this case 
health) and on freedom understood as autonomy of agency. The advantage o f the 
universality argument and health variables allows both inter-personal and inter-temporal 
comparisons although as w i l l be examined later the definition of autonomy of agency, 
what that involves and how it can be assessed is slightly more complicated. 
Also o f note about this approach is that it does not just focus on the individual but also 
recognises the social element to basic needs. As Gasper concludes "by focusing on the 
requirements o f functioning as a society member, they are close to a social exclusion 
perspective."'^° Important to note in this approach then is that 'social inclusion' 
(however that is defined) can be understood as a basic need. 
This concept of social exclusion and the powerlessness that accompanies it can be seen 
forcefully in descriptions o f poverty by those in it highlighted in the World Bank's 
Voices of the Poor Report. " In explaining poverty, poor men and women very often 
express a sense o f hopelessness, powerlessness, humiliation, and marginalization. [ . . . ] 
McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', p.4 
"•"Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', p.56 
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In Cameroon, poverty is characterized as 'a feeling of powerlessness and their inability 
to make themselves heard. 
Another approach to basic needs is that taken by Nussbaum. Gasper provides a 
summary o f her approach saying, "Nussbaum provides an objective list conception of 
well-being plus, in a pohcy context, a liberal focus on the capabilities to achieve the 
functionings highlighted in the list. In the Aristotehan tradition, pride o f place is given 
to practical reason and to affiliation with others."'^' 
A third approach is taken by Alkire in her book Valuing Freedom. "Alkire shows how, 
without necessarily measuring well-being directly, a deeply considered and an enriched 
conception o f well-being (again with an emphasis on capability) can guide local 
planning and resource allocation.""''' 
Alkire herself provides an explanation of how the capability approach has been used in 
understandings o f basic needs or basic capabilities. As she says: 
Sen might argue that the capability approach, by defining poverty with reference 
to human capabilities, and by highlighting the importance o f choice, brings 
together considerations o f the basic needs approaches which, as Streeten pointed 
out, were dealt with in a piecemeal fashion (and which included self-
determination, participation, and so on) into one coherent philosophical 
framework. Furthermore it is equally relevant for developing and developed 
countries.'^"* 
World Bank, Voices of the Poor-Volume I, I999,p.32 
Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', p.55 
Gasper, D. 'Human Well-being: Concepts and Conceptualisations', p.57 
"•^  Alkire, S. Valuing Freedoms, p.167 
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It can be seen then that there are several ways o f understanding 'basic' needs and that 
these while overlapping do also involve some divergence. It is probably fair to say that 
one o f the main strengths o f the basic needs approach, that of an objective, universal list 
o f what these needs are is also one o f its weaknesses. Still i f there can be agreement 
around the normative elements involved and also over how these are measured, given 
some would be harder to measure than others, the basic needs approach still contributes 
a valuable additional dimension to an understanding o f well-being. This is perhaps even 
enhanced further i f the approach is seen as basic capabilities instead o f basic needs. 
Issues of Measurement and Universality 
Measurement and Accuracy 
One of the advantages o f measures o f objective well-being is that they normally can 
rely on already well known data sets. The World Bank for example publishes The Little 
Data Book which is a pocket edition o f the World Development Indicators.'^^ Data 
provided includes such indicators as: l i fe expectancy; fertility rates; infant mortality; 
under five mortality; child malnutrition, H I V prevalence; gross primary and secondary 
enrolment; adult literacy; GDP; imports and exports (as % of GDP), GNI per capita and 
foreign direct investment to name but a few.'^^ While not all data is available for every 
country for every year it is easy to see why an approach to well-being that aggregate 
indicators like those listed above would be appealing. 
World Bank, The Little Data Book 2007, The World Bank, Washington D C , 2007 
World Bank, The Little Data Book 2007, p.3 
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However, as has been noted with these and other data there are significant questions, 
particularly for lower income countries over the accuracy and reliability o f the data sets. 
As Harkness notes: 
For many countries data collected on key social indicators is old, measurement 
biases and errors abound, many indicators are estimated, and data is often 
incomparable both over time within countries and at a point in time across 
countries. Even within off ic ia l international organizations publications 
inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the data abound.'^^ 
When data is available there are still questions about how it should be interpreted and 
used. Two questions related to the accuracy and reliability of the data are those o f 
weighting and scaling. Any aggregate measure o f well-being has to decide how much 
weight each individual indicator has on the aggregate. Thus a value judgement on the 
relative importance of each variable to well-being achievement has to be made.'^^ 
Scaling is necessary because the different indicators are measured in different units, life 
expectancy in years and income in dollars for example. Thus aggregate measures need 
to be able to deal with both these issues, weighting and scaling, in a way that does not 
diminish their usefulness. 
A practical example o f this is given by McGillivray and Noorbakhsh who argue that 
"component transformations - in the case o f the H D I , its rescaling procedure - can 
introduce a form of implicit weighting. This not only applies to the H D I but potentially 
Harkness, S. 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', p.96 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and 
Future', p. 125 
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to any index that combines transformed variables." 'Related to value judgements 
about weighting is the question of whether data is measuring well-being means or well-
being ends. That is, is the data measuring actual well-being or a component that leads to 
well-being. " In the cases o f the PQLI and H D I , for example, life expectancy might be 
considered as an end, but adult literacy and school enrolment only as means ." ' ' ° This is 
related to the discussion in the previous section on basic needs and can be thought o f in 
parallel to the question o f whether the HDI is measuring functionings or capabilities, or 
a combination o f both. 
Another issue to do with the measurement and accuracy o f the data is whether it 
accurately relates differences between people. Harkness points out: "Aggregate 
indicators o f social development may mask large disparities by gender, region, racial 
group, rural/urban areas or between the rich and poor. The 1993 HDR notes that making 
adjustments for gender has a large impact on the HDI ranking of countries."'^' Or as 
Klasen also notes: "There are large and persistent gender gaps in many indicators o f 
wellbeing across the world. They include gender gaps in control over economic 
resources, education, earnings, mortality, access to employment, pay, time use, safety, 
and power in the public and the private sphere."' 
Thus Sen's capability approach might provide a better approach with its distinction 
between functionings and capabilities and the possibility o f being more contextual and 
taking into account variations based on gender, geography, race etc. However, while it 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and 
Future', p. 126 
'™ McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and 
Future', p.l 17 
Harkness, S 
Klasen, S. '( 
McGillivray, M. (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p. 167 
. 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', p.104 
Gender-related Indicators of Well-being', Human Well-being: Concept and Measurement, 
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may provide these advantages, as Alkire notes, because o f these strengths it does make 
international comparability much harder (though she also argues that is not necessarily a 
problem). '" 
Universality 
The issue o f universality also helpfiilly raises the issue o f purpose. Given the multi-
dimensional nature o f well-being there are decisions that must be taken regarding the 
purpose o f the particular measures under consideration. For example, as McGillivray & 
Noorbakhsh point out: 
Universal indexes such as the H D I are currently more concerned with a 
measurement for ranking countries, and less concerned with the operational 
capability o f the index in terms of policy making at a more practical level for 
different countries. A simple response would be simply to drop a universal index 
and adopt a set o f country specific ones. But this would be at the cost o f no 
longer being able to make inter-country well-being achievement comparisons.'''' 
They make the point about country specific measures but this could also be extended to 
different groups, genders, areas etc. within a country that would enable a higher degree 
of contextualisation. Of course, as the authors note this would lose international 
comparisons but at the same time there would also be significant gains, particularly i f 
participatory research was used which would enable it to "draw out culture, location and 
social group specific understandings o f the dimensions o f well-being."' 
' " Alkire, S. Valuing Freedoms, p. 181 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and 
Future', p.128 
Pettit, J . & White, S. 'Participatory Approaches and the Measurement of Human Well-being', p.248 
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The second aspect o f universalism, which was raised earlier in the discussion of 
universal needs, regards the universality o f certain capabilities (or needs) to all people 
everywhere. 
As Anand and Sen observe, universalism is the recognition of a shared claim of 
every person to the elementary or basic capabilities required to lead a 
worthwhile life. This is in itself a defence o f many composite indexes, including 
the H D I , as few would deny that health, education and purchasing power are 
universal elementary capabilities, and as such essential elements o f a wellbeing 
vector.'^^ 
I f this idea o f universality is accepted then it enables both a universal measurement 
approach and contextual measurement o f the same factors but perhaps in different ways 
depending on local circumstances. For example the balance ascribed to quantity ( l i fe 
expectancy) and quality o f l ife might vary depending on the current state o f the country 
or social group being considered. 
Lastly universality might also suggest a direction for action would be based on the fact 
that while there may not be agreement on all factors that affect well-being, i f there is 
agreement on some basic (and arguably central) factors then the work could start in that 
area. 
Possible Future Enhancements for Objective Well-being 
It seems then that while there are clear advantages to using objective measures of well-
being; there still remain key problems both to do with operationalisation o f certain 
McGillivray, M. & Noorbakhsh, F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past Present and 
Future', p . l i 6-117 
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approaches (like basic needs) or issues surrounding data accuracy and weighting (like 
the HDI) . Another issue, which this sections explores, is regarding other concepts seen 
as important to well-being that are not currently included in the most well-known 
objective measures. The issues explored here are sustainability and liberty. Both are 
looked at in turn and possible methods o f integration into objective measures of wel l -
being are considered. 
Sustainability 
A definition of sustainability must first be provided so that the possibility o f integrating 
it into existing (or new) measures of well-being can be considered accurately. While 
different definitions o f sustainability exist the one considered here is that o f Neumayer 
who sees "sustainability as the requirement to maintain the capacity to provide non-
declining well-being over time."'^^ Neumayer goes on to give the following helpfiil 
example: 
Take the depletion of non-renewable resources and long-term environmental 
damage from carbon dioxide emissions as examples. They affect sustainability 
as, all other things equal, they diminish the value of the total capital stock 
available to future generations. They rightly form a component o f a 
sustainability indicator. But neither resource depletion nor long term 
environmental damage negatively affect current welfare.'^* 
I f this definifion is accepted then the issue is immediately raised o f how the capacity to 
provide non-declining well-being is met. Indeed, Anand and Sen view "sustainability as 
a concern for inter-generational equity and treat its demand as a reflection of the 
Neumayer, E . 'Sustainability and Well-being Indicators', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray, M. (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p. 193 
Neumayer, E . 'Sustainability and Well-being Indicators', p. 197 
92 
universality o f claims, applied to future generations vis-a-vis the current one."'^^ Thus it 
can be argued that the issue o f universality we saw in the previous section is not just 
concerned with the capabilities and well-being o f people across space but across time 
also. So as they note, sustainability involves a balance between enabling the 
achievement o f well-being in the current generation while not sacrificing the ability of 
future generations to meet their well-being needs also. 
The conceptually strong approach to sustainability does raise practical questions of 
application though. How can these issues o f measurement o f both present and capacity 
for future well-being be integrated into one approach, or even should they? This may be 
partly why as Neumayer identifies, "most indicators o f well-being ignore sustainability 
and most indicators o f sustainability ignore (current) well-being. A prominent example 
for the former is the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development 
Index (hereafter UNDP and HDI) , whereas the World Bank's Genuine Savings (GS) is 
characteristic o f the latter."'^° 
There is perhaps a way forward in developing such measures by examining how 
economics deals with future oriented problems. Indeed, for quite a while economics has 
identified this same issue and the need to develop models to take it in to account.'**' One 
measure economics has come up with is the Genuine Savings (GS) test which seeks to 
identify what is happening to the overall stock of capital. This is relevant because in 
economics it is capital that provides capacity for future production. Thus perhaps i f the 
definition o f capital was wide enough, taking into account not just physical or 
McGillivray, M. 'Human Well-being: Issues, Concepts and Measures', p.10 
Neumayer, E . 'Sustainability and Well-being Indicators', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray, M. (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p. 193 
Pigou, A. C . The Economics of Welfare (4"^  ed), Macmillan, London, 1962, p.28 
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environmental or even human, but social capital also then as Neumayer points out: " A 
Genuine Savings (GS) test could be added to a measure o f well-being (like the H D I ) 
and would indicate whether "there is a danger that the achieved level o f well-being is 
bought at the expense o f liquidating the total capital available to a country, which 
cannot be sustainable."'^^ Thus there seems to be a strong argument for incorporating 
some form of sustainability measure into understandings o f objective well-being. 
Liberty and Security 
Two issues are considered here. The first is that neither liberty nor security seem to 
feature in some of the more common conceptions o f objective well-being. The 
reasoning for this is examined and this leads on to the second issue. The second issue 
then looks at the philosophical basis for inclusion o f liberty and security considerations 
in approaches to objective well-being how this might be included in a robust fashion. 
First then as McGill ivray and Noorbakhsh note, this is a component that is currently 
very rarely included in international comparisons o f personal well-being like the H D I . 
As they say: 
While universalism offers a justification for inclusion o f certain variables in 
composite indexes, it also provides a telling criticism for the exclusion o f others, 
as there are indeed many other elementary, universal capabilities or values that 
ought in principle be included in them. One such value is basic human security. 
While human security can be variously defined, not being the victim of physical 
violence or other intimidation would appear to be a universal value. Yet, it is 
one that has received little attention in discussions centred on the H D I and other 
Neumayer, E . 'Sustainability and Well-being Indicators', Human Well-being: Concept and 
Measurement, McGillivray, M. (ed), Palgrave McMillan, Basingstoke, 2007, p.208 
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composite indexes. [ . . . ] Another possible universal value is political freedoms 
or rights. Dasgupta criticized the H D I on these grounds, claiming that it is quite 
incomplete; as it is oblivious to what is commonplace to call 'human rights'. 
McGill ivray and Noorbakhsh suggest that one of the reasons why this might be the case 
is because o f limited cross-country availability o f data and the desire to report and rank 
as many countries as possible.'^'* However, as was noted earlier in this chapter, 
measurement involves a value judgement because it has to be decided what is measured. 
When this is remembered and considered alongside the fact that there is in fact a 
significant amount o f data on security and liberty issues then simply leaving out certain 
components because o f lack o f comparison seems less likely. Indeed, it is not hard to 
imagine that issues o f liberty and security would have more political baggage and 
considerations surrounding them than components like adult literacy. 
There is also a strong argument for their inclusion as central to well-being given it can 
be argued well-being is seriously diminished i f liberty and security are lacking. Indeed 
common sense would tell us that an educated, well-nourished, rich and healthy person 
who was confined to a cell and subject to repeated beatings was not experiencing the 
highest well-being, but they would receive a high score on the HDI nonetheless. In short 
as Harkness notes, "political and civi l rights have a fundamental impact on individuals' 
wellbeing."' 
Lastly then we return to issues o f measurement. McGillivray and Noorbakhsh are 
certainly right that there would need to be some sort o f indicators that enable 
McGillivray, M. and Noorbakhsh , F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past, Present: and 
Future' p.l 16 
McGillivray, M. and Noorbakhsh , F. 'Composite Indexes of Human Well-being: Past, Present: and 
Future' p.l 17 
'"^  Harkness, S. 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', p. 106 
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comparison for security and liberty considerations to be able to integrate them into 
aggregate objecfive measures. This is not an insurmountable issue, though, as hopefully 
the next paragraph shows. 
Freedom House, an international NGO founded by Eleanor Roosevelt and others in 
1914'*^, produces a yearly report. Freedom in the World VJ\\\C\\ analyses and ranks 193 
countries and 15 disputed territories on the basis o f their c ivi l and political liberties.'*^ 
Countries receive their 'score' based on the following system explained in the report: 
The ratings process is based on a checklist o f 10 political rights questions and 15 
civil liberties questions. The political rights quesfions are grouped into three 
subcategories: Electoral Process (3 questions), Political Pluralism and 
Participation (4), and Functioning of Government (3). The civi l liberties 
questions are grouped into four subcategories: Freedom of Expression and 
Belief (4 questions), Associational and Organizafional Rights (3), Rule o f Law 
(4), and Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights (4). Raw points are awarded 
to each o f these questions on a scale o f 0 to 4, where 0 points represents the 
smallest degree and 4 the greatest degree of rights or liberties present.'** (The 
report includes the wording of all 25 questions as an appendix) 
While this certainly includes some level of normative evaluation, the procedures that are 
followed in the above example, and which could be followed in a indicator used in 
aggregate measures o f well-being, would allow for both international and inter-temporal 
comparison. Indeed, it might even be the case that taking the argument made earlier 
about the political significance o f aggregate measures in shaping policy, that countries 
www.freedomhouse.org 
Freedom in the World 2008, Introduction, (www.freedomhouse.org) 
Freedom in the World 2008, Methodology, (www.freedomhouse.org) 
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might pay more attention to liberty and security concerns i f they affected widely 
reported indicators o f objective well-being. 
We now turn to the second issue which is closely related. In the first issue we saw 
explanations as to why liberty and security were not included in current aggregate 
indicators and also arguments and methods for how they might be integrated i f so 
desired. This next issue then is the one o f why they should be so desired. In short, i f the 
first issue was how this second issue is why. To answer this question we return to Part I 
which laid out three philosophical approaches to understanding well-being. It w i l l be 
argued that all three (albeit in somewhat different forms) suggest that some form of 
liberty and security are necessary for human well-being. 
First then we consider utilitarianism. It is no coincidence that Mi l l ' s work on 
utilitarianism was complemented with work he did on liberalism, most notably in his 
book On Liberty. M i l l argued that individuals needed protection and rights not just 
against government but against society as a whole and the 'tyranny o f the majority' . 
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As Riley goes on to elaborate: "general security is an ingredient of general welfare." 
He goes on to describe it as a "kind of ut i l i ty." '^ ' This view of security being a 
component part o f utilitarianism and an individuals utility is seen also in the work of 
Shaw who notes: " i t seeks to protect individual choice and autonomy and to give people 
reasonably wide scope to live as they wish, fi-ee f rom criticism or punishment as long as 
they adhere to the basic moral rules and refrain from harming o t h e r s . " ' I t seems then 
Mill, JS, Utilitarianism, p.73 
Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.316 
Riley, J. 'Mill's Political Economy', p.316 
Shaw, W, 'Contemporary Criticisms of Utilitarianism: A Response', p.213 
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that a fairly strong argument can be made for the inclusion of security in considerations 
of well-being from a utilitarian standpoint. 
We look next at Rawls' Theory of Justice which we saw in Part 1 was, in part, an 
explicit counter to utilitarian conceptions of human well-being. However, regarding 
security and liberty these are both considered 'basic' rights by Rawls. Freeman provides 
a helpful summary of what constitutes basic liberties and highlights the parallels with 
Mil l . 
Rawls's first principle, the principle of equal basic liberties, parallels J.S. Mill 's 
principle of liberty in that it is conceived as defining constitutional limits on 
democratic government. Rawls sees certain liberties as "basic." These include 
liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of association, and the 
rights and liberties that define the freedom and integrity of the person (including 
freedom of movement, occupation, and choice of careers, and a right to personal 
property); also included for Rawls are equal poHtical rights of participation and 
the rights and liberties that maintain the rule of law. To call these liberties 
"basic" means (in part) that they are more important than others.''^ 
What is also worth noting is that these 'basic' liberties take precedence over other 
aspects of justice as fairness. As Freeman notes, "because of their role in defining the 
conception of moral persons that underlies Rawls's view, justice as fairness assigns the 
basic liberties strict priority over other social goods. This means basic liberties can be 
limited only for the sake of maintaining other basic liberties."'^"* It seems then that both 
Freeman, S, 'Introduction', Cambridge Companion to Rawls, Freeman, S (ed), CUP, Cambridge, 
2003, p.4 
Freeman, S, 'Introduction', p.5 
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Mill and Rawls see a crucial place for liberty and security in their understandings of 
well-being. 
What about the third philosophical approach, that of Sen? The concept of liberty is 
central to the work of Sen also. Indeed, he perhaps goes further than both Mill and 
Rawls because Sen sees liberty as crucial to the understanding and assessment of 
capabilities.'^^ Liberty is also understood by Sen as 'freedom to achieve', which leads to 
two evaluative spaces of'well-being freedom' and 'agency freedom'.'^^ This focus on 
freedom is identified by other authors also. Harkness provides a helpful summary 
noting; "as Sen has argued, the ability of people to play an active and critical role in 
their choice of leaders, to express opinions, and to be protected from abuse and other 
environmental factors is critical in shaping welfare."'^^ 
It seems then that with regard to liberty and security there seems to be substantial 
agreement between the different philosophical approaches that some conception of 
freedom (and the conceptions themselves do differ) is necessary for human well-being. 
Thus it is suggested that while practical and philosophical issues remain, there is a 
strong case for the inclusion of some form of liberty and security in conceptions of 
objective well-being. 
Overall then it seems there are strong reasons to consider objective measures of well-
being when looking at well-being as a whole. This would hopefully be particularly 
fruitful i f it used the basic capabilities approach put forward by Sen and Alkire among 
others. As has been noted there are still though issues of measurement and accuracy that 
Sen, 'Capability and Well-being', p.274 
Sen, 'Capability and Well-being', p.275 
Susan Harkness, 'Social and Political Indicators of Human Well-being', p. 106 
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need to be investigated but these should not in anyway thwart a further use of indicators 
of more than income in discussions about well-being. 
Conclusion 
It is hoped that the title of this thesis which most probably seemed somewhat obscure at 
the beginning is now somewhat clearer. The purpose of the tide was to embody the 
object and questions of the thesis. That is, what is the relationship between 
philosophical and operational approaches to well-being. How important is it and in what 
ways is it important? 
We saw with the example of welfare economics how what started as fairly 
straightforward applications of utilitarianism (with Bentham's calculus) became, 
through the modification of economic theory over many decades to seem quite different 
from its original genesis. We saw how it still held on to some of the basic concepts but 
also diverged from others, sometimes quite substantially. It was also hopefully shown, 
through the example of economics, the crucial importance of theoretical assumptions 
and their profound impact on the operational outcomes of particular approaches. While 
this may seem common sense it is a point worth noting given the potential implications. 
Other philosophical approaches were also considered, those of Rawls and Sen. We saw 
that in some respects the operationalisation of Rawls' difference principle could be 
down in the same operational frame as that of utilitarianism, namely via a social welfare 
function. The advantages and contributions made by Rawls were also considered and 
potential challenges or difficulties also noted. 
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Alongside certain forms of welfare economics which operationalised Rawls' approach 
we also considered objective well-being measures, some of which drew similarities with 
Rawls over the need for primary or basic goods. Differences were also noted though and 
the evaluation of objective well-being returned us to the third philosophical approach. 
The philosophical approaches then concluded with an analysis of Sen's capability 
approach. Both the multi-dimensional nature and distinctions between different 
evaluative spaces and states (i.e. well-being agency or well-being achievement) were 
considered. Sen's focus on functionings as determinants of capabilities and their 
relationship to well-being was also considered. Returning to the second chapter of Part 
II on objective well-being we saw the efforts of people like Alkire to operationalise 
Sen's capability approach in particular settings. 
It is thus hoped that this thesis has contributed to the discussion and evaluation of multi-
dimensional approaches to well-being and that the link between philosophical and 
operational approaches to well-being will be further studied for benefits for all. 
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